

To Tom Watson
Rant Morris

**DISARMAMENT:
WEAPON
of
CONQUEST**

Robert Morris

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DEDICATION

Dedicated to my mother, Sarah Williams Morris,
for her loving affection and indeed to all mothers
who yearn for real disarmament.

FOREWORD

This book is written because I feel that very few people understand what our policy is as we coexist with Soviet power on the earth and in the universe.

There are enough escaping manifestations of underlying policy to sketch its lineaments sufficiently for us to know generally where, unless it is reversed, we are going. The people controlling our destiny should, I contend, let us know what is going on. We may not like what they have planned for us. But, certainly, open discussion has always been a hallmark of a free society; and great civilizations, from Greece with its Socrates, to modern times, have always had the right to examine the foundations of their policies.

This book, then, is written in the spirit which prompted Socrates, who by constant probing upheld the right to know where he was, and where he was going.

Our leaders are talking about Disarmament. When we analyze what they mean by "Disarmament", we find it to be something very much different, indeed, from the conventional meaning of that word. Let us have a look, and make some comments along the way.

ROBERT MORRIS
August 1963

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I THE PROBLEM

The principal problem, from our point of view on the world scene, stems from Soviet power. This force has declared war on us, again and again. Khrushchev has often said that the United States will be Soviet in the next generation. Every authoritative Soviet resolution, declaration and utterance speaks of victory of World Communism over us. Soviet leaders work day and night for the defeat of the United States of America.

These Soviet leaders are achieving spectacular success. During World War II, they had one country and one base of power. They now have extended their cruel domination over one third of the earth's conventional surface and have made great inroads in the second, or neutral third of our sphere. In outer space they have done even better. This success has results that extend into every phase of our existence.

Actually, when you examine the ingredients, the Soviets are waging World War III against us and our allies. They have killed millions of men on the battlefields, in the streets, and on the torture racks. They have taken more terrain than the Genghis Khans, the Attilas, the Hitlers and the Tojos combined. Recently, they have moved an expeditionary force across the Atlantic to our doorstep and established a missile base in Cuba, as well as an air base, a submarine base, and a base for sabotage and infiltration. From Cuba, all South America now is under siege.

As I write this, Communists are making their way down the Ho Chi Minh trail into Laos where they are putting the finishing touches to the conquest of that hub of Southeast Asia. They are waging war and committing terror in Southern Viet Nam. They hold the hundreds of millions of Chinese in bondage. Their domination embraces the vastness of Siberia, Sakhalin, Manchuria, Mongolia and Tibet.

No such martial blight has struck humanity in modern times.

The effective leadership of the United States should be able to understand these elemental facts. Yet, as far as successful action has been concerned, these leaders have not even recognized the problem.

The fall of China was achieved largely by what our own policy planners and diplomats wrought. The United States Senate had a two-year damage survey made, and it established authoritatively, by a unanimous report, that Americans were, in large measure, responsible for the conquest of China.

With respect to Cuba, it has been quite conclusively established that Castro, the Communist, received help from the United States where policy planners worked to undermine the government that Castro was stalking. When these planners leveled that government, they recognized Castro, the Communist, ignoring other available alternatives.

After Castro came to power, these men who should have been thwarting Soviet power brought him to the United States, enhanced his prestige and proceeded to subsidize his fledgling government.

When Khrushchev moved tanks, MIGs and electronic equipment to the island base, our government spokesmen minimized, and even denied, that these

weapons of war were brought almost to our very shores. When the troops came, they were called "technicians", not by Castro, but by our own government spokesmen who should have been sounding the alarm instead of putting our people to sleep.

When it became apparent that an expeditionary force had, indeed, landed, we were told that it was purely a defensive move, made because Castro was weak and needed shoring up. When the missiles appeared they were "defensive" missiles.

These planners have been working, obviously, to put us to sleep. Why?

In little Laos, the situation is much the same. While Soviet power moves forward remorselessly, we struggle, not to roll it back, but to coexist with it in a coalition government. And, while we neutralize and spike the guns of Laotians who want to defend their land, Communists move on with their conquests, their killings, and their acts of terror.

While the Soviet leaders have been moving aggressively ahead, we have persisted in attributing to them our norms of morality, our standards of right and wrong, and our respect for the solemnity of the plighted word.

The Soviet leaders, on the other hand, have a slogan expressing their attitude toward these things: "Treaties, like pie crusts, are made only to be broken." They live up to this slogan and, on the basis of the record, a Soviet promise is worthless.

Not so long ago, it was said that our policy was one of "containment." While it was largely unsuccessful, at least containment was the goal. The failure was in the implementation and in the actions of the personnel responsible. Now, however, our goal is quite different—different, and yet, scarcely known.

II OUTCROPPINGS OF OUR POLICY

For years, in the semi-official and official circles of Washington, we kept hearing what we discerned to be the outcroppings of an extraordinary policy. The people responsible for planning would, from time to time, say that we should not directly oppose Communist power or Communist institutions, but rather try to persuade Soviet leaders to tone down their conspicuously aggressive utterances and actions. They said that since Communist institutions, such as forced-labor camps, were here to stay, one should not inveigh against them lest that futile action lead to unnecessary aggravations. Confrontation between Communist and Free World forces became a dirty word. Escalation, the word used to describe the growth of a small conflict into a larger one, became the favorite word of the planners who counselled retreat or inaction in the face of the Soviet movement forward.

The Korean War, which was to mark the first time that the nation was denied a victory that its highly competent military leaders said could and should have been achieved, raised the specter, to some, that victory for freedom was not the goal of our policy.

Then the paralysis, or worse, of the mighty United States, when the self-emancipated Hungarian people were ruthlessly crushed by the "Butchers of Budapest", showed that our talk of "liberation" of the captive peoples was hollow, indeed.

It was not the threat of nuclear war that caused our retreat in Korea, because when General MacArthur was recalled in 1951 the Soviet Union was not a nuclear power. In 1956, when Hungary was crushed, the Soviets could not have held a candle to us in nuclear prowess.

Thus, while we began to see a lapsing in policy away from containment, the new substitute was never spelled out. In 1961, the Fulbright Memorandum saw the light of day and a fragment was revealed. We learned then, of the dangers of Cuba and Laos. These, we were told, were dangers, not because they represented Soviet victories and the enslavement of more millions of people, but rather because they set in motion a "desire" in the American people "to hit the Communists with everything we've got."

This new emerging policy never was set forth clearly, however, until two events broke into the news—our Disarmament Program and the Rostow Memorandum.

III THE ROSTOW MEMORANDUM

Let us look first at the Rostow Memorandum although it was not the first of the two revealing documents to break forth, in point of time.

Walt W. Rostow is the Chief Policy Planner of the United States State Department. For many years he worked on covert CIA projects at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and elsewhere. He is also Counsel to the State Department. He speaks with authority.

We are fortunate to have in Washington today an enterprising reporter, Willard Edwards of the *Chicago Tribune*. Mr. Edwards has had extensive experience; he has excellent sources. Through him, we were able to learn about the "Memorandum" which Mr. Rostow has refused to give to the United States Senate, claiming "executive privilege."

I have checked the accuracy of the Edwards account of this important policy paper which Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen made the object of a Senate inquiry, and I am going to let the *Congressional Record* of June 18, 1962 tell the story of this chapter: (pages 9966, 9967, 9968)

WALT W. ROSTOW'S DRAFT OF STRATEGY

MR. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, over the past weekend there appeared in the Sunday and Monday morning editions of the *Chicago Tribune* two lengthy stories under the byline of Willard Edwards purporting to digest the so-called Rostow draft of a

blueprint for future strategy in the struggle against communism.

For many months now we have been told that this document has been in a state of preparation under the guiding hand of Walt W. Rostow, State Department counselor and chairman of its Policy Planning Board.

On several occasions there have appeared in the press other stories discussing this draft of strategy, but none has presented so much in such detail as Mr. Edwards' story and I am impelled to believe that it is probably accurate.

Many of us who are not unfamiliar with Rostow's thinking have awaited the birth of this new master strategy with considerable trepidation. Mr. Rostow has never been a very devoted disciple of the tough policy line toward Russia. It now develops, on the basis of the *Chicago Tribune* articles, that Mr. Rostow holds some unique ideas about the Soviet Union that are considerably closer to the fuzzy thinking of the late and lamented "Liberal Papers" than even the most liberal Member of this body would be willing to accept.

The core of Mr. Rostow's proposal is an assumption that the Soviet Union and its Communist masters are "mellowing"; that Russia is becoming a mature state; that if we are only nice to the Soviets they will drop all of their suspicions of the free world and peace will finally bloom.

The most amazing Rostow thesis is this: That both the United States and Russia are losing power and authority in their respective worlds and that an area of "overlapping interests" is developing in which meaningful agreements may be concluded between the Communist and non-Communist worlds.

Mr. Rostow sees no victory by the United States over the Soviet Union. Mr. Rostow sees no victory by capitalism over communism. In fact Mr. Rostow is a man of little hope and the last person in my opinion who should have been chosen for the all-important task of directing the continuing review of our foreign policy.

The basic philosophy of successful conflict is always to pursue a winning course and always change a losing game. Every high school coach, every big league manager knows this. But apparently our State Department planners do not.

If Mr. Rostow's assumption that the Soviet Union is softening is correct, then what may I ask caused it to mellow? To me the answer is obvious. The only time we have ever gotten anywhere with the Soviet Union—the only times the Soviet Union has ever mellowed—have been when the United States was tough.

So logic would say that if Mr. Rostow's basic assumption were correct and that the Soviet Union is softening, Mr. Rostow is recommending a course exactly diametric to American interests.

But the disconcerting part of the whole picture is this: Our intelligence agencies say there is little or no evidence to support any such assumption as that made by Mr. Rostow.

How does Mr. Rostow explain the recent Russian course of breaking the moratorium on nuclear testing? How does he explain their recent announcement that they are now going to test a 100-megaton bomb in retaliation for our resumption of testing?

Does the presence of our Armed Forces in Thailand indicate the Communists are mellowing? Does the presence of our Armed Forces in Vietnam

indicate the Communists are mellowing?

I think the Senate is entitled to know—perhaps through questioning by the appropriate committee—what intelligence information Mr. Rostow possesses to support his basic assumption. Mr. Edwards' articles indicate that Mr. Rostow has held this opinion for at least 10 years. If it is only opinion, I would suggest that it is not proper ground on which to stake the entire future of the American people.

I ask unanimous consent to include as part of my remarks Mr. Edwards' articles, so that the Senate may examine them in detail.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the **Record**, as follows:

[From the *Chicago Tribune*, June 17, 1962]

Draft Foreign Policy Revision Bowing to Reds
(By Willard Edwards)

Washington, June 16.—A master plan for historic changes in U.S. foreign policy has been readied for President Kennedy's consideration.

It embraces the theme that the Soviet Union's domestic and foreign policies are mellowing and the way is open for meaningful agreement between the Communist and non-Communist worlds.

This proposed guide for future decisions by the President and the National Security Council, the Nation's highest strategy group, advances these theories:

Russia's leaders are beginning to realize that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can defeat the other in the world of the future.

FIND NO BASIS FOR IT

Both the United States and Russia are losing power and authority in their respective areas and

an area of overlapping interests is developing in which mutually profitable agreements may be negotiated.

Envisioning, as it does, Communist abandonment of the goal of world conquest, this blueprint for future strategy has aroused heated dispute from military leaders and intelligence agencies who can detect no evidence to support its assumptions.

They quarrel with the contention that conciliation can be as important as a strong defense in future relations with the Kremlin.

Leading sponsor of the plan, which has been more than a year in preparation, is Walt W. Rostow, State Department counselor and Chairman of its Policy Planning Board. He acknowledges that a strong educational campaign will be needed to sell Congress and the public if the proposals are given official sanction.

SHAPED CAMPAIGN SPEECHES

Compiled under Rostow's supervision, the strategy plan represents the work of many officials in the White House, State, Treasury, and Defense Departments. It has been steadily revised and edited down, from an original volume of 285 pages to a shorter draft.

Despite a host of contributors, the plans bears the Rostow stamp. A former member of the faculty of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Rostow, 45, is the President's top foreign policy adviser. He played a major role in shaping Kennedy's foreign policy speeches in the Presidential campaign and was deputy special assistant to the President until he took over his present State Department post last December 6.

Rostow's brand of philosophy, not concealed in

books, articles, theses, and speeches in recent years, has always envisioned the "evolution" of Soviet Russia into a "mature" state which will come to realize the outdating of the Marxian theory of the class struggle as the moving force in history.

FOR A NEW YOUNG PRESIDENT

As long ago as 1956, he voiced confidence that Communist leaders in the next decade would mend their ways and in 1958 he was depicting Russia as about ready to enter "the age of high mass consumption" reached by the United States a quarter century earlier.

He has now translated this optimistic conviction into a blueprint for basic national security policy, designed to govern future decisions at the highest levels.

It is a conception calculated to stimulate and enthuse a new, young President who could insure a secure place in history as the American leader who brought peace to the world, ending not only the dread potentialities of nuclear conflict, but the harassments of cold war conflicts which drain the economy.

NOT A SHRED OF PROOF

It is also a theory which has stirred many in the Government's intelligence agencies to alarm. They report not a scrap of hard data to support the roseate assumptions of the State Department planner.

They note no lessening of Communist intransigence nor of grim determination to "bury" the free world. They see in the Rostow recommendations a total misconception of the nature of the Communist conspiracy; a naive brushing off of its treachery as evidenced in a long history of broken treaties and

agreements while steadily pursuing the goal of world conquest.

Rostow believes that Premier Nikita Khrushchev of Russia and his associates do not want a major war. He concedes their desire for a total victory for communism but he glimpses changes beneath the surface of old Communist objectives and a willingness among some in Russia to modify old ideological formula in the light of changing reality.

UNITED STATES ON WANE, HE SAYS

Neither Russia nor the United States is going to dominate this century, he contends. To those who speak of a "victory" or "win" policy in the cold war, he retorts that neither of the great leading nations will win over the other. Rather, the victory will be one of "men and nations" voluntarily cooperating under the principles of the United Nations Charter.

"And we deeply believe this victory will come—on both sides of the Iron Curtain," he concludes.

The policy outline pictures the United States and Russia as two aging combatants, both showing signs of waning prestige and power. There is a diffusion of power away from Moscow within the Communist bloc, it asserts, and away from the United States within the free world.

In lesser degree, the "evolution" theory is also applied to Red China and the same conciliatory tactics are advocated. The Chinese Communists can be encouraged to "evolution" into a peaceful state by showing them we have no aggressive intentions.

Possibilities should be explored for expanding contact with Red China, placing it, according to one objector, in the same position as Yugoslavia and Poland.

CAN'T PROMOTE A SPLIT

There is no final bar to entrance of Communist China into more normal relations with the United States if they are prepared to modify present policies, the policy paper asserts. In the meantime, unnecessary provocations should be avoided and informal negotiations pursued.

There is little that the United States can do to promote a Sino-Soviet split, the paper contends.

The proposed foreign policy guide book does not suggest any weakening of national defense and includes recommendations for a greater buildup of the nation's capacity to wage conventional warfare.

It estimates Soviet policy as designed to avoid any actions which would bring about a nuclear war, ruling out the belief of many military leaders that the Communists will strike whenever they think they can destroy us.

WE WILL WAIT TO BE HIT

Any idea of the United States contemplating a "first strike" is ruled out. Planning in that direction is not relevant since the United States does not plan to initiate a nuclear attack on Communist nations. Military men assail the section as against all sound principles of war for which planning against all contingencies is essential.

Despite all rebuffs to date, strenuous efforts should be continued to get an agreement on limited arms control, the policy paper recommends. It is suggested that the United States might advance a program not requiring formal negotiations.

Again, objectors to this recommendation argued, the proposal totally disregards the nature of the Communist enemy. Any information fur-

nished to Communists will be used against us and any such action will never change their basic aims.

REDS GOING PEACEFUL

Since both arms control planning and research and military planning are directed toward national security, the strategy outline asserts, they should be integrated. General and complete disarmament is a goal which must never be obscured.

There was objection from military men to inclusion of this section. They argued that the nature of communism is disregarded in a process of reasoning which contends that the United States will be secure in a disarmed world.

In seeming answer to these contentions, the proposed policy emphasizes the assumption that the Soviet policy will evolve into a peaceful state.

Even if Communist leaders are unwilling to share the U.S. image of the world's future in the degree necessary to negotiate major arms reduction programs, they may come to realize the dangers of accident, miscalculation, and failure of communications and thus be willing to join the United States in limited measures to reduce those dangers.

[From the Chicago Tribune, June 18, 1962]

Soft Red Line Must Be "Sold"—Rostow

(By Willard Edwards)

Washington, June 17.—A systematic publicity campaign will be necessary to sell Congress and the American people on the merits of a bold new foreign policy advocating conciliation of Russia, a State Department planner has advised.

The problem of this gap between Government and popular thinking is tackled with candor by Walt W. Rostow, chairman of the State Department's

policy planning board in his draft of a master plan which awaits President Kennedy's consideration.

The new policy, the work of a number of experts in Government under Rostow's supervision, is based upon the theory that Russian domestic and foreign policies have mellowed during the post-Stalin period. It holds the way has been opened for cooperation between the Communist and non-Communist worlds.

EDUCATION IS NEEDED

Since the evidence in the form of deeds and words by Soviet leaders, runs directly contrary to this assumption, Congress and the people, the Rostow outline confesses, must be educated to acceptance of a fresh approach.

In typical State Department parlance, this can be accomplished by "systematic exposition in forms appropriate for public presentation." The term "indoctrination" is avoided.

One of the appropriate methods of public enlightenment, favored highly by the Kennedy administration, is the newspaper "leak." This involves funnelling of selected information to favored reporters.

CITE "OUTMODED" POLICIES

Although the Rostow document is presumed to be confidential and described by a State Department spokesman as a "working draft," hints of its contents have been leaked in the last 3 months to three newspapers, a news magazine, and a syndicated column. The resulting articles in the main, feature it as "a premise, balanced, and complete master plan of global objectives and strategies" which would replace "old policies," manufactured under crisis conditions.

These inspired stories lacked detail, in most instances, but stressed the need for replacement of policies "left over" from the Eisenhower administration. The existence of "ambiguities" has permitted dispute between partisans of different concepts and contributed to varying interpretations of policy, they noted.

HINT ON A-STRATEGY

One "leak" was definite, however, in reporting a provision that the United States would never strike the first nuclear blow unless it were faced with a massive conventional assault, such as a full-scale invasion of Western Europe.

Another revealed proposed new policies for dealing with the problem of the "two Chinas" on the mainland and Formosa.

Speeches and statements by administration spokesmen to condition Congress and the public to the new policy are also suggested in the Rostow document. Rostow has set a good example in this respect. In a number of addresses, he has stated his conviction that neither the United States nor Russia can win the cold war, that capitalism will not triumph over communism, and that the fate of the world will be settled by forces now at work on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

SEES NEW LINEUP

In a speech June 3 at Minneapolis, Rostow said:

"It is sometimes asked if our policy is a no-win policy. Our answer is this—we do not expect this planet to be forever split between a Communist bloc and a free world. We expect this planet to organize itself in time on the principles of voluntary cooperation among independent nation states dedi-

cated to human freedom. We expect the principle that 'governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed' to triumph on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

"It will not be a victory of the United States over Russia. It will be a victory of men and nations over the forces that wish to entrap and to exploit their revolutionary aspirations."

In another speech to the special warfare school at Fort Bragg, N.C., he voiced the same sentiments and added "It will not be a victory of capitalism over socialism."

Two years ago, in a California speech, he outlined Russia's fears that other nations would get the nuclear bomb, calling the prospect of nuclear weapons in Chinese hands "a latent nightmare" for the Kremlin.

RUSSIA OUR ALLY

He saw in this a possibility that Russia might find "the only logical course is to make a common cause with the United States to establish a minimum framework of order."

Thus, Rostow's policy draft contains few surprises to students of his record. He is aware of the initial lack of popular acceptance which will greet its unfolding. Suggested in the draft is a shifting of emphasis, particularly in the public consciousness, from the problem of opposing Communist aggression to exploiting opportunities in building and extending "a community of free nations."

These "opportunities" are described in the document as growing from a gathering historical trend toward fragmentation in the Communist bloc and some relaxation of internal controls in the Soviet Union and its satellites.

Thus, Communist regimes and peoples are to be dealt with in terms of "overlapping interest," a phrase which is also popular with Rostow in public statements.

The United States Information Agency must be used abroad to define and dramatize the "limited but real areas of overlapping interests" between the United States and other governments and peoples, the paper asserts.

Students of Communist policy eye this alleged intertwining of interests with strong doubt, noting that Communists have never admitted any interest which lies outside world domination.

One theme is consistent in the proposed strategy plan—continuing communication with Russia, informal and formal, direct and indirect, must be maintained in order to dispel its fears of the United States and give it a clear understanding of our peaceful intentions.

Rising tensions or the pleas of our allies or of the American public must be ignored in any crisis with Russia. The temptation must be avoided to prolong or expand any crisis in an effort to degrade or embarrass the Soviets in the eyes of the world.

The Soviet Union, the paper advises, must be granted its status as a great power and induced, by word and deed, to fuller participation and influence in the community of free nations if its leaders show a genuine interest and will for such constructive consideration.

EASY ON SATELLITES

Gentle treatment of the satellite nations is advocated. No official attacks should be made against their regimes, whatever the provocation, and even criticism should be softened. Western Europe, at

the same time, must be encouraged to closer relationship with the satellites and urged to furnish aid to them.

East Germany, the policy draft says, cannot be forever insulated from dealings with the United States and business must be transacted with them.

Above all, no encouragement or support must be given to armed uprisings in eastern Europe. This is a continuance of policy in existence for several years.

These proposals, one critic noted, will in effect recognize the satellites, including East Germany, as legitimate regimes, disregard the principle of self-determination, and cause the captive peoples to lose all hope of freeing themselves from Communist rule.

A POPULAR WORLD

The plan is concerned with the promotion of rapid industrial growth and full employment in the United States. Unless there is great prosperity here, it noted, it will be extremely difficult to obtain congressional and popular consent for allocation of resources to international purposes or liberal trade adjustments.

The word "modernization" appears frequently in the plan in relation to the development of nations. The strength of international communism, it states, can best be sapped by strengthening the performance of the free community through "modernization." Opponents of the policy draft have suggested that "modernization" may be a synonym for "Democratic socialization."

The United States must expand its participation in institutions and organizations "which transcend the independent powers of the nation-state," the outline proposes.

It seeks progressive moves toward a legal order which lays down and enforces essential rules of conduct in interstate relations which will "provide sure and equitable means for the settlement of international disputes."

Again, in arguments over this proposal, it was noted that it presupposes Communist submission to the law. One expert recalled the sardonic comment made by the late Andrei Y. Vishinsky, chief delegate to the United Nations. He once told the U.N.:

"What laws? We make our own. We do not abide by bourgeoisie law."

SEEKS MODERN ALLIES

On balance, the draft asserts, American interests will be better served by leaning toward nations with modern ideas rather than sticking to old allies with outmoded notions. The paper identifies neither the modern states nor the old friends, conceding no general rule can cover this situation.

As a final touch, the policy paper suggests that denial of foreign aid can be as useful as supplying it. In Laos, where aid was withdrawn to force a coalition with Communists, this policy has already been implemented, it was noted.

MR. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I might add, as a postscript, that I believe a great deal more will be said about this subject because without doubt it will be one of the most important challenges before the American people and this country as we deal with this comment upon the so-called policy or strategy that we are to employ in the days ahead.

More than a year has passed since this disclosure, and unfolding events clearly reveal the ac-

curacy of the Edwards articles.

Briefly, the contention of Mr. Rostow was that Soviet power was "mellowing" and that the Soviet Union was "evolving" into a "mature" state and that we should help this process. For this reason we had to reject any desire for a victory over Soviet power. Instead, we were to work for a victory of "men and nations" cooperating under the banner of the United Nations.

Accordingly, we were to extend "gentle treatment" toward the satellites. We were not to be hostile to these Soviet regimes, no matter what the provocation; under no circumstances should we encourage armed uprisings on the part of the captive peoples. The Chinese Communists, even, were to be encouraged toward this evolutionary process by our showing them that we have no aggressive intentions toward them.

According to the Rostow memorandum we were to work, strenuously, always toward the goal of general and complete disarmament, despite all rebuffs, **"even to the extent of advancing a program not requiring formal negotiations."** (Emphasis mine)

Events of the passing year have revealed that this is, indeed, our policy today.

But, in the United States, not one person in a thousand knows that this is our foreign policy. Some people have heard the expression that we have a "no win" policy, but "no win" tells only part of the story. When all the pieces are put into place, our policy calls for an affirmative drive toward a mammoth "accommodation" with Soviet power. Therefore, the enemy is not Khrushchev, or his cronies, but those people here and abroad who are against what will be shown to be a merger with the Soviet Union.

Because Americans do not know that this is State Department policy, they cannot understand why we will not raise a finger for the Cuban exiles but, instead, arrest the determined freedom fighters who want to free Cuba. Nor can they understand why the State Department issues a report on the savage and blood-soaked Budapest regime that reads like a product of Kadar's own propoganda agency. For the same reason Americans do not understand why we lavish billions on the cruel dictators Tito, Gomulka and Sukarno.

Last year, when the United States sent guns and planes to shoot down President Tshombe's supporters who wanted a certain amount of autonomy in their land, plain citizens could not understand why we would commit such nonsensical deeds. If they could have read the Rostow report, or had studied our so-called "disarmament" policy, it would have become clear.

When we forced General Nosavan and the loyal Laotians into a forced coalition with the Communists in Laos, people were perplexed. They should not have been. Our whole policy reflects, despite steadfast Soviet intransigence, a determined drive to effect what has been called a "peaceful merger with the Soviet Union."

IV "DISARMAMENT"

In 1959, Khrushchev, ringed by United States defensive bases in Allied countries, able to recognize in our Strategic Airforce Command and in our Navy with its Polaris submarines, enough power to destroy him several times over, took an assessment of where he stood. He knew that there was only this mighty force between him and his dream, and the dream of Lenin and of Stalin before him, the dream of world domination. So, he moved against this mighty force—not as Hitler moved, but by a strategy which he called "Disarmament."

Speaking on September 18, 1959, at the United Nations General Assembly, Khrushchev proposed that "over a period of four years, all states should effect complete disarmament, and should no longer have any means of waging war."

The reaction to this was soon forthcoming. The *New York Times* commented editorially the next day: "The Soviets still seek a one-sided Western disarmament, based on paper pacts, the scraps of which litter their path to empire."

Speaking to the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet on October 31 of that year, Khrushchev said: "We propose to effect as quickly as possible, approximately in four years, general and complete disarmament of states. This means that all armed forces are to be disbanded, all armament liquidated, war production discontinued, and nuclear, chemical, bacteriological, and rocket weapons banned and destroyed for

good; that war ministries and general staffs should be abolished; that foreign military bases on foreign territory should be liquidated, that nobody would receive military training again, and that expenditures for military purposes of any kind should cease."

The skepticism which had been expressed by *The New York Times*, and virtually every other major newspaper in the country, did not long prevail. Walt W. Rostow and Jerome Wiesner, advisers to the newly-elected President, John F. Kennedy, went to Moscow in late 1960 and returned amid rumblings about some kind of agreement on disarmament.

Bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States then took place in Washington from June 19 to June 30; in Moscow from July 17 to 29, and in New York from September 6 to 19. By September 20, 1961, we had actually come to an agreed set of eight principles on disarmament with Soviet delegate to the United Nations, Valerin Zorin. They appear as follows, in the Report of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency:

1. The goal of negotiations is to achieve agreement on a program which will insure that (a) disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems, and (b) such disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

2. The program for general and complete disarmament shall insure that states will have at their disposal only those nonnuclear armaments, forces,

facilities, and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens; and that states shall support and provide agreed manpower for a U.N. peace force.

3. To this end, the program for general and complete disarmament shall contain the necessary provisions, with respect to the military establishment of every nation, for—

(a) Disbanding of armed forces, dismantling of military establishments, including bases, cessation of the production of armaments as well as their liquidation or conversion to peaceful uses;

(b) Elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological, and other weapons of mass destruction and cessation of the production of such weapons;

(c) Elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction;

(d) Abolishment of the organizations and institutions designed to organize the military effort of states, cessation of military training, and closing of all military training institutions;

(e) Discontinuance of military expenditures.

4. The disarmament program should be implemented in an agreed sequence, by stages until it is completed, with each measure and stage carried out within specified time limits. Transition to a subsequent stage in the process of disarmament should take place upon a review of the implementation of measures included in the preceding stage and upon a decision that all such measures have been implemented and verified and that any additional verification arrangements required for measures in the next stage are, when appropriate, ready to operate.

5. All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any state or group of states gain military advantage and that security is insured equally for all.

6. All disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honoring their obligations. During and after the implementation of general and complete disarmament, the most thorough control should be exercised, the nature and extent of such control depending on the requirements for verification of the disarmament measures being carried out in each stage. To implement control over and inspection of disarmament, an International Disarmament Organization, including all parties to the agreement, should be created within the framework of the United Nations. This International Disarmament Organization and its inspectors should be assured unrestricted access without veto to all places as necessary for the purpose of effective verification.

7. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. During and after the implementation of the program of general and complete disarmament, there should be taken, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security, including the obligation of states to place at the disposal of the United Nations agreed manpower necessary for an international peace force to be equipped with agreed

types of armaments. Arrangements for the use of this force should insure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

8. States participating in the negotiations should seek to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date. Efforts should continue without interruption until agreement upon the total program has been achieved, and efforts to insure early agreement on and implementation of measures of disarmament should be undertaken without prejudicing progress on agreement on the total program and in such a way that these measures would facilitate and form part of that program.

Here was the transition from the Khrushchev demand of 1959 to our own policy of today. The world was generally scoffing at Khrushchev in 1959 when he proclaimed this goal. It should have known from past performances that this new stratagem portended great changes, not in the Soviet Empire but here in the heartland of capitalism. The whole Soviet apparatus went to work on us.

V STATE DEPARTMENT
DOCUMENT 7277

By September 25, 1961, there was presented to the United Nations the United States' own "Program for General and Complete Disarmament." This provided as follows:

**FREEDOM FROM WAR
THE UNITED STATES PROGRAM FOR
GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT
IN A PEACEFUL WORLD**

SUMMARY

DISARMAMENT GOAL AND OBJECTIVES

The over-all goal of the United States is a free, secure, and peaceful world of independent states adhering to common standards of justice and international conduct and subjecting the use of force to the rule of law; a world which has achieved general and complete disarmament under effective international control; and a world in which adjustment to change takes place in accordance with the principles of the United Nations.

In order to make possible the achievement of that goal, the program sets forth the following specific objectives toward which nations should direct their efforts:

The disbanding of all national armed forces and the prohibition of their reestablishment in any form whatsoever other than those required to preserve internal order and for contributions to a United Nations Peace Force;

The elimination from national arsenals of all armaments, including all weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery, other than those required for a United Nations Peace Force and for maintaining internal order;

The institution of effective means for the enforcement of international agreements, for the settlement of disputes, and for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the United Nations;

The establishment and effective operation of an International Disarmament Organization within the framework of the United Nations to insure compliance at all times with all disarmament obligations.

TASK OF NEGOTIATING STATES

The negotiating states are called upon to develop the program into a detailed plan for general and complete disarmament and to continue their efforts without interruption until the whole program has been achieved. To this end, they are to seek the widest possible area of agreement at the earliest possible date. At the same time, and without prejudice to progress on the disarmament program, they are to seek agreement on those immediate measures that would contribute to the common security of nations and that could facilitate and form part of the total program.

GOVERNING PRINCIPLES

The program sets forth a series of general principles to guide the negotiating states in their work. These make clear that:

As states relinquish their arms, the United Nations must be progressively strengthened in order to improve its capacity to assure international security

and the peaceful settlement of disputes;

Disarmament must proceed as rapidly as possible, until it is completed, in stages containing balanced, phased, and safeguarded measures;

Each measure and stage should be carried out in an agreed period of time, with transition from one stage to the next to take place as soon as all measures in the preceding stage have been carried out and verified and as soon as necessary arrangements for verification of the next stage have been made;

Inspection and verification must establish both that nations carry out scheduled limitations or reductions and that they do not retain armed forces and armaments in excess of those permitted at any stage of the disarmament process; and

Disarmament must take place in a manner that will not affect adversely the security of any state.

DISARMAMENT STAGES

The program provides for progressive disarmament steps to take place in three stages and for the simultaneous strengthening of international institutions.

FIRST STAGE

The first stage contains measures which would significantly reduce the capabilities of nations to wage aggressive war. Implementation of this stage would mean that:

THE NUCLEAR THREAT WOULD BE REDUCED:

All states would have adhered to a treaty effectively prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons.

The production of fissionable materials for use in weapons would be stopped and quantities of such

materials from past production would be converted to non-weapons uses.

States owning nuclear weapons would not relinquish control of such weapons to any nation not owning them and would not transmit to any such nation information or material necessary for their manufacture.

States not owning nuclear weapons would not manufacture them or attempt to obtain control of such weapons belonging to other states.

A Commission of Experts would be established to report on the feasibility and means for the verified reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles.

STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES WOULD BE REDUCED:

Strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles of specified categories and weapons designed to counter such vehicles would be reduced to agreed levels by equitable and balanced steps; their production would be discontinued or limited; their testing would be limited or halted.

ARMS AND ARMED FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED:

The armed forces of the United States and the Soviet Union would be limited to 2.1 million men each (with appropriate levels not exceeding that amount for other militarily significant states); levels of armaments would be correspondingly reduced and their production would be limited.

An Experts Commission would be established to examine and report on the feasibility and means of accomplishing verifiable reduction and eventual elimination of all chemical, biological and radiological weapons.

**PEACEFUL USE OF OUTER SPACE
WOULD BE PROMOTED:**

The placing in orbit or stationing in outer space of weapons capable of producing mass destruction would be prohibited.

States would give advance notification of space vehicle and missile launchings.

**U.N. PEACE-KEEPING POWERS
WOULD BE STRENGTHENED:**

Measures would be taken to develop and strengthen United Nations arrangements for arbitration, for the development of international law, and for the establishment in Stage II of a permanent U.N. Peace Force.

**AN INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT
ORGANIZATION WOULD BE ESTABLISHED
FOR EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION OF
THE DISARMAMENT PROGRAM:**

Its functions would be expanded progressively as disarmament proceeds.

It would certify to all states that agreed reductions have taken place and that retained forces and armaments do not exceed permitted levels.

It would determine the transition from one stage to the next.

**STATES WOULD BE COMMITTED TO
OTHER MEASURES TO REDUCE
INTERNATIONAL TENSION AND TO
PROTECT AGAINST THE CHANCE OF
WAR BY ACCIDENT, MISCALCULATION,
OR SURPRISE ATTACK:**

States would be committed to refrain from the threat or use of any type of armed force contrary to the principles of the U.N. Charter and to refrain

from indirect aggression and subversion against any country.

A U.N. peace observation group would be available to investigate any situation which might constitute a threat to or breach of the peace.

States would be committed to give advance notice of major military movements which might cause alarm; observation posts would be established to report on concentrations and movements of military forces.

SECOND STAGE

The second stage contains a series of measures which would bring within sight a world in which there would be freedom from war. Implementation of all measures in the second stage would mean:

Further substantial reductions in the armed forces, armaments, and military establishments of states, including strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and countering weapons;

Further development of methods for the peaceful settlement of disputes under the United Nations;

Establishment of a permanent international peace force within the United Nations;

Depending on the findings of an Experts Commission, a halt in the production of chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons and a reduction of existing stocks or their conversion to peaceful uses;

On the basis of the findings of an Experts Commission, a reduction of stocks of nuclear weapons;

The dismantling or the conversion to peaceful uses of certain military bases and facilities wherever located; and

The strengthening and enlargement of the International Disarmament Organization to enable it

to verify the steps taken in Stage II and to determine the transition to Stage III.

THIRD STAGE

During the third stage of the program, the states of the world, building on the experience and confidence gained in successfully implementing the measures of the first two stages, would take final steps toward the goal of a world in which:

States would retain only those forces, non-nuclear armaments, and establishments required for the purpose of maintaining internal order; they would also support and provide agreed manpower for a U.N. Peace Force.

The U.N. Peace Force, equipped with agreed types and quantities of armaments, would be fully functioning.

The manufacture of armaments would be prohibited except for those of agreed types and quantities to be used by the U.N. Peace Force and those required to maintain internal order. All other armaments would be destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes.

The peace-keeping capabilities of the United Nations would be sufficiently strong and the obligations of all states under such arrangements sufficiently far-reaching as to assure peace and the just settlement of differences in a disarmed world.

Here is our policy set forth. Our planners began to move, not to extend freedom or to thwart Soviet aggression, but to bring about the reduction of military forces and to build up an International Peace Force under the United Nations which would rule the world. That became the main preoccupation while

Khrushchev maintained his power drive. The Soviets were, in their own words, the “locomotive” of history, while we, psychologically, were preparing for accommodation and disarmament. We were being put off balance.

VI U.S. ARMS CONTROL

To implement this disarmament program, the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was set up by Act of Congress. Here is the background and the purpose of the organization as it appears in the Agency's own first annual report: (page 3)

The act establishes the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. It defines "arms control" and "disarmament" to mean the identification, verification, inspection, limitation, control, reduction, or elimination, of armed forces and armaments of all kinds under international agreement including the necessary steps taken under such an agreement to establish an effective system of international control, or to create and strengthen international organizations for the maintenance of peace. The act asserts that the Agency must have such a position within the Government that it can provide the President, the Secretary of State, other officials of the Executive branch, and the Congress, with recommendations concerning U.S. arms control and disarmament policy. In addition, it describes in general terms the nature and quality of the staff which the Director is required to assemble. It provides that the organization must have the capacity to provide essential scientific, economic, political, military, psychological and technological information upon which realistic arms control and disarmament policy must be

based. The organization must also be able to carry out these primary functions:

(a) The conduct, support, and coordination of research for arms control and disarmament policy formulation:

(b) The preparation for and management of U.S. participation in international negotiations in the arms control and disarmament field;

(c) The dissemination and coordination of public information concerning arms control and disarmament; and

(d) The preparation for, operation of, or, as appropriate, direction of U.S. participation in such control systems as may become part of U.S. arms control and disarmament activities.

The law also provides that the Director shall serve as principal adviser to the Secretary of State and to the President on arms control and disarmament matters. The Director, under the direction of the Secretary of State, has primary responsibility within the Government for arms control and disarmament matters.

NEW ORGANIZATION

In commencing operations, the new agency took over the State Department's U.S. Disarmament Administration, including its personnel and its functions.

In anticipation of expanded staff activity, and in order to provide for the performance of new duties imposed by law, a new pattern of internal organization was established.

A general advisory committee, authorized by statute, will be composed of national leaders in diverse fields, some of whom have served as senior

officials of Government. It will meet periodically to advise the Director.

The United Nations, too, was working toward "Disarmament." A ten-nation committee on disarmament was set up, composed of five western nations and five Soviet nations. Later this group was expanded to eighteen, with the following "neutrals" being added: Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic. It will be readily seen that this selection veers distinctly to Khrushchev's side.

Inasmuch as General de Gaulle rejects the goal of the plan—a merger of forces under the United Nations, he did not deign to send a representative to many of the conferences, so that, in effect, it is a seventeen-nation committee, listing toward Khrushchev's left.

VII WE OFFER A TREATY

On April 18, 1962, we offered the Soviet Union a treaty to implement our Program for General and Complete Disarmament before the 17-nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva. It was during this period that Khrushchev moved his expeditionary force across the Atlantic to Cuba.

The four-page summary of this "treaty" made by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency reads:

**OUTLINE OF BASIC PROVISIONS
OF A TREATY ON GENERAL AND
COMPLETE DISARMAMENT IN A
PEACEFUL WORLD
SUMMARY
PRINCIPLES AND PROCESS
OF DISARMAMENT**

Disarmament would be implemented progressively and in a balanced manner so that at no stage could any state or group of states obtain military advantage. Compliance with obligations would be effectively verified. As national armaments were reduced, the United Nations would be progressively strengthened.

Disarmament would be accomplished in three stages—the first to be carried out in 3 years; the second, also in 3 years; and the third, as promptly as possible within an agreed period of time. Stage I would be initiated by the United States, the Soviet Union, and other agreed states. All militarily signif-

icant states would participate in Stage II; and all states possessing armaments and armed forces, in Stage III.

DISARMAMENT MEASURES

A. **ARMAMENTS.** During Stage I, inventories of major categories of both nuclear delivery vehicles and conventional armaments would be reduced by 30 percent. Fixed launching pads would be reduced with associated missiles. Half of the remaining inventories would be eliminated during Stage II, and final reductions would be made in Stage III. Upon the completion of Stage III, states would have at their disposal only agreed types of nonnuclear armaments for forces required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens.

Production of armaments during Stage I would be limited to agreed allowances and would be compensated for by the destruction of additional armaments to the end that reductions would not be impaired. In Stage II, production of armaments would be halted except for parts for maintenance of retained armaments. Any further production of national armaments would be ended in Stage III except for production of agreed types of nonnuclear armaments for internal forces.

Military research, development, and testing would be subject to increasing limitations during the disarmament process. During Stage III, appropriate action would be taken to insure that new scientific discoveries and technological inventions of military significance were not used for military purposes.

B. **ARMED FORCES.** Force levels of the United States and Soviet Union would be reduced to 2.1 million at the end of Stage I. Half of the remaining forces of these two states would be disbanded dur-

ing Stage II, and final reductions would be made in Stage III. Other states would also progressively reduce their force levels. By the end of Stage III, states would have at their disposal only those agreed forces and related organizational arrangements required to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens.

C. NUCLEAR WEAPONS. Production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons would be halted in Stage I, and limitations would be imposed on the production of fissionable materials for other purposes. The availability of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons would be reduced during Stage I and subsequent stages by safeguarded transfers to nonnuclear weapons purposes.

If nuclear weapons tests had not already been halted under effective international control, arrangements to this end would be undertaken in Stage I. States which had manufactured nuclear weapons would agree in Stage I not to transfer control over nuclear weapons to states which had not manufactured them or to assist such states in their manufacture. States which had not manufactured nuclear weapons would refrain from seeking them. Transfers of fissionable materials between states would be limited to peaceful purposes and would be safeguarded.

Beginning in Stage II, nonnuclear components and assemblies of nuclear weapons would be destroyed and limitations would be imposed on further production or refabrication of nuclear weapons. At the end of Stage II, remaining nuclear weapons would be registered internationally to assist in verifying the fact that by the end of Stage III states would not have such weapons at their disposal.

D. OUTER SPACE. The placing of weapons of mass destruction in orbit would be prohibited in Stage I, and limitations would be imposed on the production, stockpiling, and testing of boosters for space vehicles. States would support increased cooperation in peaceful uses of outer space.

E. MILITARY BASES. Reduction of military bases, wherever they might be located, would be initiated in Stage II, and final reduction would be made in Stage III.

F. MILITARY EXPENDITURES. Military expenditures would be reported throughout the disarmament process.

VERIFICATION

The verification of disarmament would be the responsibility of an International Disarmament Organization, which would be established within the framework of the United Nations. Reductions of armaments and armed forces would be verified at agreed locations; and limitations on production, testing, and other specified activities, at declared locations. Assurance that agreed levels of armaments and armed forces were not exceeded and that activities subject to limitation or prohibition were not being conducted clandestinely would be provided through arrangements which would relate the extent of inspection at any time to the amount of disarmament being undertaken and to the risk to the disarming states of possible violations.

Such assurance might, for example, be accomplished through arrangements under which states would divide themselves into a number of zones through which inspection would be progressively extended. By the end of Stage III, when disarmament had been completed, all parts of the territory

of states would have been inspected.

REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR

To promote confidence and reduce the risk of war during the disarmament process, states would, beginning in Stage I, give advance notification of major military movements and maneuvers, establish observation posts to report on concentrations and movements of military forces, and insure rapid and reliable communications among heads of governments and with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

An International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War would examine possible extensions and improvements of such measures as well as additional measures to reduce the risk of war through accident, miscalculation, failure of communications, or surprise attack.

ARRANGEMENTS FOR KEEPING THE PEACE

In Stage I, states would undertake obligations to refrain from the threat or use of force of any type contrary to the United Nations Charter. Throughout the three stages of disarmament, states would use all available means for the peaceful settlement of disputes, would seek to improve processes for this purpose, and would support measures to improve the capability of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security.

A United Nations Peace Observation Corps would be established in Stage I, and a United Nations Peace Force, in Stage II. The United Nations Peace Force, which would be equipped with agreed types of armaments and would be supplied agreed manpower by states, would be progressively strengthened until, in Stage III, it would be fully capable

of insuring international security in a disarmed world.

We see here implementation of the policy to transfer military strength from national armies to an all-powerful United Nations army. Stage I and stage II are to be of three years' duration.

An all-powerful World Court with absolute jurisdiction also is proposed. The treaty reads:

"1. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

A. In light of the study of peaceful settlement of disputes conducted during stage I. the Parties to the Treaty would agree to such additional steps and arrangements as were necessary to assure the just and peaceful settlement of international disputes, whether legal or political in nature.

B. The Parties to the Treaty would undertake to accept without reservation, pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 1 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the compulsory jurisdiction of that Court to decide international legal disputes."

This, of course, means the revocation of the Connally Reservation. (*)

The Soviets submitted their own version of that treaty which provided that each of the first two stages be of two years' duration and complete disarmament be achieved in four years.

(*) When The United States became a signatory to the U.N. Treaty, the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, under the Chairmanship of Senator Tom Connally (Dem.-Texas) stipulated that the United States would submit to the U.N. judicial arm, the International Court of Justice, on international matters, with domestic issues, as **decided by the United States**, reserved for the U.S. Courts. This qualification has been known as the Connally Reservation.

VIII IT IS FOR REAL

During this period clusters of citizens around the country were beginning to learn what our disarmament policy was. They did not like what they learned. Concern began to spread.

Some of our leading citizens, noting this trend, had inquired of our Washington officials, including Cabinet officers, about the folly of turning our defense establishment over to the United Nations.

Our fellow-citizens were assured by the Washington officials (who were not directly concerned with disarmament negotiations) that we would not disarm—that we were only going through the motions in the U.N. to mollify the neutrals. I had heard earlier that State Department officials were also telling top newspapermen the same thing.

Let us look at what some of our officials directly concerned were, however, actually saying for the record: Here is William C. Foster, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: "U.S. Disarmament proposals are, most emphatically, not intended for propaganda purposes. They are a sober statement of action policy which, if agreed to by the Soviet Union, could result in a world free from the scourge of war and the dangers and burdens of armaments in which the use of force has been subordinated to the rule of law and in which international adjustments to a changing world are achieved peacefully . . . the problem is not what would happen if U.S. disarmament proposals

were accepted. The problem is to gain support for these proposals and to negotiate the necessary details of them into specific agreements.”

Here is Adlai Stevenson, United States Ambassador to the U.N., speaking in an official U.S. bulletin entitled “Disarmament—the New U.S. Initiative”: “In short, the United States program calls for the total elimination of national capacity carried out by each side, every step of the way, the plan calls for the creation of an International Disarmament Organization within the framework of the United Nations . . . It is presented in dead earnest.”

Arthur H. Dean, our Chief Representative to the Geneva Disarmament Conference stated officially: “Frankly, in spite of my daily preoccupation with the affairs of our conference, I still remain in awe of the objective which we have set before ourselves in Geneva. We are not primarily discussing measures to calm the international scene or to facilitate partial disarmament, although there is some of this. Our main attention is for the retention of limited internal security forces inside each country and for the maintenance of a United Nations Peace Force.”

IX ADLAI STEVENSON CARRIES IT FORWARD

In September 1962, Adlai Stevenson, speaking before the General Assembly of the United Nations, carried the theme forward. He said:

“A great achievement of our last session was to endorse an agreement on a set of principles for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. But we—while we have made some progress, we have not made enough toward transplanting these agreed principles into an agreed plan—to move by mutual actions in rapid stages toward total disarmament and effective international peacekeeping. The United States has proposed such a plan. It has submitted its proposals to this Assembly and to the 18 nation Disarmament Conference at Geneva.”

Mr. Stevenson thus affirmed in September, 1962, that our “Disarmament Plan” submitted a year earlier still represented the policy of the United States of America.

That plan was not a “disarmament” plan at all. Disarmament takes place when all the nations of world destroy their arms and effectively agree to arm no more. Our plan advocated the transfer of military supremacy from where it is now, largely with the United States, to the nations making up the General Assembly of the United Nations. The force which will, in three stages, possess all the weapons of the world, except for internal policing,

is called the United Nations Peace Force.

On previous occasions, Mr. Stevenson had said, and this was a necessary corollary of his 1962 position, that the resulting U.N. Peace Force should be stronger than any combination of nations in the world. Clearly, he intends that the U.N. should supercede his own government in military strength. Under the United States proposal "No state (is) to have the military power to challenge the progressively strengthened U.N. Peace Force."

History and good sense demonstrate that the force which has all the weapons and the military power rules the world. Clearly, what Adlai Stevenson advocated was a United Nations so strong that it would effectively rule the world—the United States included. That is what everyone in the United States should know, for it is our expressed policy.

Secretary of State Rusk said recently that "each addition to the list of nuclear powers will make more complicated and difficult the negotiations of effective control arrangements that we must sooner or later achieve, if we are to avoid the ultimate disaster of nuclear incineration." At this point, General de Gaulle and Sir Winston Churchill expressed deep concern about giving up their nuclear deterrents and being swept away by Dean Rusk and Khrushchev, as tiny dwarfs, in a massive "synthesis", as U Thant calls the process of merging with Soviet power.

The honest acknowledgment that this "accommodation" is our policy is long overdue. The Rostow report should have been released, not hidden by "executive privilege." The treaty that we have put on the table at Geneva, calling for the dismemberment of our national defense establishment, should have been dramatized, not slyly denied, when con-

cerned citizens asked if it was real—as, indeed, it is.

We have a right to know these things because they all add up to the surrender of our heritage. The chimerical assumption that Khrushchev, Mao, and the so-called neutrals like Sukarno would allow us, a small minority, to hold onto our way of life in the resulting concensus is unreal. The fact of the matter is that Communism is not mellowing at all. It is even more intransigent as it calls over and over for “victory” for world Communism while its deeds and threats to “pulverize” us implement those never-ending chants.

The missiles in Cuba, the terror campaigns in Viet Nam and Angola, the shootings at the Berlin Wall, the implacable drive in South America—all make Walt Rostow sound fantastic.

It was during this period, almost while Ambassador Stevenson spoke, that Khrushchev was moving missiles into Cuba, putting himself in a position to threaten nuclear blackmail from that vantage point. Soviet missiles in Cuba would take away the thirty-minute-or-so warning time that we now have against missiles launched from the Soviet Union. This thirty minutes is vital because it enables us to get our deterrent force off the ground.

Probably no two events better point up the futility of our present policy than these two—the moving of Soviet missiles to Cuba in the days after we put a treaty on the table at Geneva offering to dissolve our national military defense establishment.

X THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH AT AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

On June 10, 1963, the underlying story reached the surface. This time, it came, not indirectly through an enterprising reporter as did the Rostow memorandum, but in the President's own words at a commencement speech at American University in Washington.

Here is what the President said: "Our primary long-range interest in Geneva, however, is general and complete disarmament—designed to take place by stages, permitting parallel political developments to build the new institutions of peace which would take the place of arms."

On the world order, the President, too, reaffirmed what our policy papers had all recommended—the strengthening of the United Nations into a world government. His exact words were: "Meanwhile, we seek to strengthen the United Nations, to help solve its financial problems to make it a more effective instrument for peace, to develop it into a genuine world security system—a system capable of resolving disputes on the basis of law, of insuring the security of the large and the small, and of creating conditions under which arms can finally be abolished."

This speech was a most important reaffirmation of our policy that had, up until then, been released piecemeal. It was no longer possible to deny that our policy was to work toward an accommodation with the Soviet Union on the basis of a merger

with the Soviet Union under the United Nations.

Those portions of the Rostow report which had stated that our goal was a "victory" not of the United States over the Soviet Union, a "victory" not of Capitalism over Socialism but rather a victory of "men and nations" under the banner of the United Nations, have been officially confirmed. The President used the term "Pax Americana" to disavow the hitherto traditional policy of the United States to extend liberty and freedom as civilization has known these concepts. This was a milestone.

Reflecting the more direct words of the Rostow Memorandum, the President also said: "We must, therefore, persevere in the search for peace in the hope that constructive changes within the Communist bloc might bring within reach solutions which now seem beyond us. We must conduct our affairs in such a way that it becomes in the Communists' interest to agree on a genuine peace. And above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or nuclear war. To adopt that kind of course in the nuclear age would be evidence only of the bankruptcy of our policy—or of a collective death-wish for the world.

"To secure these ends, America's weapons are non-provocative, carefully controlled, designed to deter and capable of selective use. Our military forces are committed to peace and disciplined in self-restraint. Our diplomats are instructed to avoid unnecessary irritants and purely rhetorical hostility."

Two days after this conciliatory talk, Khrushchev detonated two nuclear blasts and followed with

another a week later, on June 19.

Then, by way of emphasizing his point, he spoke before the Plenary Meeting of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on June 21, two days later, and said:

“We must know that the enemy is now sharpening his poisonous ideological weapon for more bitter clashes with us. It is reminiscent of what the Red Army men said during the Civil War: we have one outstanding issue with the White Guards on which we cannot agree, the simple question of land. The White Guards want to bury us in it and we want to bury them. Who will bury whom first—this is the little outstanding question with capitalism.

“We have a similar outstanding question with capitalism. It wants to bury the socialist system and we want—and not only want but have dug quite a deep hole, and shall exert efforts to dig this hole deeper—to bury forever the capitalist system, the system of exploitation, wars, and plunder. That capitalism will collapse, of this there is no doubt. But it will not collapse of itself.

“Our successes will inspire the working class of all the capitalist countries to more decisive and active revolutionary class struggle. And we have helped and will continue to help them by our example of building communism. The peoples of the various countries fighting for their freedom and independence are receiving assistance from us today, and tomorrow there will be even greater possibilities for rendering assistance of another character.”

Still making his point, Khrushchev had the full

text of his remarks printed in the *Moscow News* of July 6. (No. 27 (654) page 8.)

Insofar as I could discern, the State Department gave currency neither to this publication nor to the detonation of the nuclear tests. Apparently this news did not fit the image of a "mellowing" Khrushchev which the State Department is trying to sell to the American people.

XI "THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW"

The international rule of law has been an ideal of man since the beginning of time. No man of good-will opposes this long-sought dream.

The framework which our planners are using to relate this dream to reality is fraught with frailties and infiltration by a force that is inherently anti-law.

The United States State Department, and now the President, are offering to disband our military establishments in three stages, if the Soviet Union and other nations do the same. We are offering to work for the simultaneous creation of an International Peace Force that will become progressively strengthened so that by Stage III, it will be, in the language of the treaty submitted at Geneva "fully capable of insuring international security in a disarmed world."

Thus, "Disarmament" is being used as a cover for the creation of an international "rule of law" or world government, with disputes referred to an all-powerful world court. Of course, as we observed earlier, this is not disarmament at all. The result of the dissolution of existing armies and the simultaneous creation of an International Peace Force is really the transfer of military strength from where it is now to the United Nations under U Thant. With this transfer, Khrushchev will have achieved his goal expressed in 1959, of removing the last barrier between himself and world domination—the military

strength of the United States.

Should this plan be enacted and carried out, the United States would disarm. If there were any dragging of feet on the part of our leaders, or cheating, there would be vocal forces in the United States to proclaim to the world whatever delay or lapse on our part there might be. But in the controlled press of the Soviet Union, even if there were limitless inspection rights, we would never learn the facts if the Soviet military hid caches of nuclear arms in the vastness of Siberia, China, Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet or Eurasia. All one need do is to look at the extensive areas of the Soviet Empire, with all its rugged, mountainous terrain of caves and dales, to know the practical impossibility of inspecting Soviet territory.

During Stage II, according to the proposed treaty, all nations will have to submit to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.

This is world government in every sense of the word. An all-powerful international army, with an all-powerful court under the same auspices, can be considered nothing else but world government. What else does international rule of law imply?

On June 29, 1963, *The New York Times* said editorially on this point: "The difficulty is that the essence of law is not only justice; it implies command. To be binding, world law needs a supranational body with power to enforce the international laws that are agreed upon. Otherwise, they are not 'law'; they are principles and practices that would be 'obeyed' only by those nations which have accepted the laws."

When the idea of an international army was

proposed during World War II, it was rejected by the then leaders of the State Department because it necessarily implied "international control of production, of communications, of transportation and even labor supply."

To show how plans are being laid for the far-reaching application of international control of all phases of human endeavor, let the Unesco Convention Against Discrimination in Education speak.

XII UNESCO

On December 14, 1960 UNESCO, a specialized agency of the United Nations drafted, unanimously, the following resolutions:

B. CONVENTION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL CONFERENCE AT ITS ELEVENTH SESSION

ARTICLE 1

I. Convention Against Discrimination in Education

1. For the purposes of this Convention, the term 'discrimination' includes any distinction, exclusion, limitation or preference which, being based on race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic condition or birth, has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing equality of treatment in education and in particular:

- a. Of depriving any person or group of persons of access to education of any type or at any level;
- b. Of limiting any person or group of persons to education of an inferior standard;
- c. Subject to the provisions of Article 2 of this Convention, of establishing or maintaining separate educational systems or institutions for persons or groups of persons; or
- d. Of inflicting on any person or group of persons

conditions which are incompatible with the dignity of man.

2. For the purposes of this Convention, the term 'education' refers to all types and levels of education, and includes access to education, the standard and quality of education, and the conditions under which it is given.

ARTICLE 2

When permitted in a State, the following situations shall not be deemed to constitute discrimination, within the meaning of Article 1 of this convention:

a. The establishment or maintenance of separate educational systems or institutions for pupils of the two sexes, if these systems or institutions offer equivalent access to education, provide a teaching staff with qualifications of the same standard as well as school premises and equipment of the same quality, and afford the opportunity to take the same or equivalent courses of study;

b. The establishment or maintenance, for religious or linguistic reasons, of separate educational systems or institutions offering an education which is in keeping with the wishes of the pupil's parents or legal guardians, if participation in such systems or attendance at such institutions is optional and if the education provided conforms to such standards as may be laid down or approved by the competent authorities, in particular for education of the same level;

c. The establishment or maintenance of private educational institutions, if the object of the institutions is not to secure the exclusion of any group but to provide educational facilities in addition to those provided by the public authorities, if the institu-

tions are conducted in accordance with that object, and if the education provided conforms with such standards as may be laid down or approved by the competent authorities, in particular for education of the same level.

ARTICLE 3

In order to eliminate and prevent discrimination within the meaning of this Convention, the States Parties thereto undertake:

- a. To abrogate any statutory provisions and any administrative instructions and to discontinue any administrative practices which involve discrimination in education;
- b. To ensure, by legislation where necessary, that there is no discrimination in the admission of pupils to educational institutions;
- c. Not to allow any differences of treatment by the public authorities between nationals, except on the basis of merit or need, in the matter of school fees and the grant of scholarships or other forms of assistance to pupils and necessary permits and facilities for the pursuit of studies in foreign countries;
- d. Not to allow, in any form of assistance granted by the public authorities to educational institutions, any restrictions or preference based solely on the ground that pupils belong to a particular group;
- e. To give foreign nationals resident within their territory the same access to education as that given to their own nationals.

ARTICLE 4

The States Parties to this Convention undertake furthermore to formulate, develop and apply a national policy which, by methods appropriate to the circumstances and to national usage, will tend to

promote equality of opportunity and of treatment in the matter of education and in particular:

- a. To make primary education free and compulsory; make secondary education in its different forms generally available and accessible to all; make higher education equally accessible to all on the basis of individual capacity; assure compliance by all with the obligation to attend school prescribed by law;
- b. To ensure that the standards of education are equivalent in all public educational institutions of the same level, and that the conditions relating to the quality of the education provided are also equivalent;
- c. To encourage and intensify by appropriate methods the education of persons who have not received any primary education or who have not completed the entire primary education course and the continuation of their education on the basis of individual capacity;
- d. To provide training for the teaching profession without discrimination.

ARTICLE 5

1. The States Parties to this Convention agree that:

- a. Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; it shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace;
- b. It is essential to respect the liberty of parents and, where applicable, of legal guardians, firstly to choose for their children institutions other than those maintained by the public authorities but con-

forming to such minimum educational standards as may be laid down or approved by the competent authorities and, secondly, to ensure in a manner consistent with the procedures followed in the State for the application of its legislation, the religious and moral education of the children in conformity with their own convictions; and no person or group of persons should be compelled to receive religious instruction inconsistent with his or their convictions;

c. It is essential to recognize the right of members of national minorities to carry on their own educational activities, including the maintenance of schools and, depending on the educational policy of each State, the use or the teaching of their own language, provided however:

(i) That this right is not exercised in a manner which prevents the members of these minorities from understanding the culture and language of the community as a whole and from participating in its activities, or which prejudices national sovereignty;

(ii) That the standard of education is not lower than the general standard laid down or approved by the competent authorities; and

(iii) That attendance at such schools is optional.

2. The States Parties to this Convention undertake to take all necessary measures to ensure the application of the principles enunciated in paragraph 1 of this Article.

ARTICLE 6

In the application of this Convention, the States Parties to it undertake to pay the greatest attention to any recommendations hereafter adopted by the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization de-

fining the measures to be taken against the different forms of discrimination in education and for the purpose of ensuring equality of opportunity and treatment in education.

ARTICLE 7

The States Parties to this Convention shall in their periodic reports submitted to the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization on dates and in a manner to be determined by it, give information on the legislative and administrative provisions which they have adopted and other action which they have taken for the application of this Convention, including that taken for the formulation and the development of the national policy defined in Article 4 as well as the results achieved and the obstacles encountered in the application of that policy.

ARTICLE 8

Any dispute which may arise between any two or more States Parties to this Convention concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention, which is not settled by negotiation shall at the request of the parties to the dispute be referred, failing other means of settling the dispute, to the International Court of Justice for decision.

ARTICLE 9

Reservations to this Convention shall not be permitted.

ARTICLE 10

This Convention shall not have the effect of diminishing the rights which individuals or groups may enjoy by virtue of agreements concluded between two or more States, where such rights are not contrary to the letter or spirit of this Convention.

ARTICLE 11

This Convention is drawn up in English, French, Russian and Spanish, the four texts being equally authoritative.

ARTICLE 12

1. This Convention shall be subject to ratification or acceptance by States Members of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures.

2. The instruments of ratification or acceptance shall be deposited with the Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

ARTICLE 13

1. This Convention shall be open to accession by all States not Members of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization which are invited to do so by the Executive Board of the Organization.

2. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument of accession with the Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

ARTICLE 14

This Convention shall enter into force three months after the date of the deposit of the third instrument of ratification, acceptance or accession, but only with respect to those States which have deposited their respective instruments on or before that date. It shall enter into force with respect to any other State three months after the deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance or accession.

ARTICLE 15

The States Parties to this Convention recognize that the Convention is applicable not only to their metropolitan territory but also to all non-self-governing, trust, colonial and other territories for the international relations of which they are responsible; they undertake to consult, if necessary, the governments or other competent authorities of these territories on or before ratification, acceptance or accession with a view to securing the application of the Convention to those territories, and to notify the Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization of the territories to which it is accordingly applied, the notification to take effect three months after the date of its receipt.

ARTICLE 16

1. Each State Party to this Convention may denounce the Convention on its own behalf or on behalf of any territory for whose international relations it is responsible.

2. The denunciation shall be notified by an instrument in writing, deposited with the Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

3. The denunciation shall take effect twelve months after the receipt of the instrument of denunciation.

ARTICLE 17

The Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization shall inform the States Members of the Organization, the States not members of the Organization which are referred to in Article 13, as well as the United Nations, of the deposit of all the instruments

of ratification, acceptance and accession provided for in Articles 12 and 13, and of the notifications and denunciations provided for in Articles 15 and 16 respectively.

ARTICLE 18

1. This Convention may be revised by the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Any such revision shall, however, bind only the States which shall become Parties to the revising convention.

2. If the General Conference should adopt a new convention revising this Convention in whole or in part, then, unless the new convention otherwise provides, this Convention shall cease to be open to ratification, acceptance or accession as from the date on which the new revising convention enters into force.

ARTICLE 19

In conformity with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations, this Convention shall be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations at the request of the Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

Done in Paris, this fifteenth day of December, 1960, in two authentic copies bearing the signatures of the President of the eleventh session of the General Conference and of the Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, which shall be deposited in the archives of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, and certified true copies of which shall be delivered to all the States

referred to in Articles 12 and 13 as well as to the United Nations.

While this Convention and these resolutions have not been submitted to the United States Senate for ratification, this plan looking to the making of the education of all men over the world monolithic, is now actually in the wings.

XIII WHAT IS WRONG WITH THIS POLICY?

This blending or "merger" of nations under the United Nations might be a thrilling concept if the United Nations were made up of idealistic men and nations. The fact is that it is not. It is an admixture of power politicians, many of them ruthless and lawless.

The Soviet Union, with twelve disciplined satellites, stands right in the middle of the organization. It has, to start with, 12 votes out of 111 in the General Assembly and a minimum of 2 in the 11 nations Security Council.

Furthermore, U Thant has insisted that bristling Red China, still at war with the U.N. itself, be admitted to the world body. With Khrushchev and Mao constituting two of the five permanent members of the Security Council, the Soviet base would be formidable indeed.

Moreover, there is a whole string of left-leaning "neutrals" who regularly vote with Khrushchev, in concert with his campaigns of conquest through "peaceful coexistence" and "decolonialization." Indonesia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Algeria, Cambodia, United Arab Republic, Burma, Afghanistan, Laos, Yemen and Brazil are consistent supporters of Khrushchev's programs in the United Nations.

Further, the bizarre success of the Soviet Union in infiltrating Western and neutral delegations, and the Secretariat itself, has made the news over and over. Alger Hiss, the first Secretary General at San

Francisco, was shown conclusively to have engaged in Soviet espionage. The head of the Canadian delegation to the U.N. in the 1950's was shown to have had important Communist links, and the Senate Committee on Internal Security put into the record testimony concerning his Communist membership, as well as a security report that had severe repercussions.

Khrushchev and Mao, and for that matter Gomułka, Castro and Tito do not use the instruments of world peace to work for peace as we know it. "Peace" to a Communist exists when all resistance to Communism has been broken. That is the most fundamental concept in the Communist lexicon.

Where Communists are, intrigue will prevail. For the idealistic West or the non-Communist East to shut its eyes to this established fact is to court disaster.

An even more fundamental defect in this plan is the incredible assumption that Khrushchev and his confederates will allow an international peace force to be operational at all. The plan presumes that the Soviet military will disarm and not conceal, deep in the recesses of Siberia and Eurasia, sufficient nuclear strength to bring us to bay while we go through with the disarmament process. Competent military men and responsible observers of Soviet strategy have told us that if we had a veritable army of inspectors with limitless inspection rights, we could never properly cover the vastness of the Soviet territory.

Even if the Soviet Union should wait for the United States to disarm and for the International Peace Force to come into being and gain enough military strength to be operational under the terms

of our proposals, the U.S.S.R. would retain an enormous advantage. For, with substantial representation, and with additional infiltration into the "Peace Force" itself, it could easily work to thwart the discovery of its own concealed military strength.

There can be no doubt that the Soviets have a plan to control the resulting combine. Failing that, as the record already has demonstrated on several occasions, they certainly will have enough power within the "Peace Force" to nullify any repressive action against them.

In short, this whole plan will be successful only with permanent Soviet good faith and Communist cooperation every step of the way. Not only is this being taken for granted, but there is an equally naive assumption that Communist nature will change when we reach the merger stage and that these hardened Communists will abandon their goals of a lifetime and work for what is basically a bourgeois way of life—the international rule of law as civilized men have envisioned it.

I submit that the record simply does not support the idealistic conclusions of our policy leaders. This, indeed, is a very dangerous game they are playing.

XIV WHOSE INTERNATIONAL LAW?

The idealistic search for international law is rhapsodic and inviting. But, practically speaking, there are certain elemental facts that cannot be wished away.

Only a handful of the nations in the United Nations have a common-law heritage. These are mostly in the British Commonwealth. Of course, we have it. We, alone, have the very thrilling Bill of Rights with its solemn guarantees of individual protection.

Only a minority of nations now have the free enterprise system. Many are either Socialist or outright Soviet. When men of the West talk of "the international rule of law" we conjure up the utterances of the Cokes and the Blackstones, our Bill of Rights, our Constitution or the French Declaration of the Rights of Man.

However, Khrushchev, Mao, Castro and Tito and their allies have never been students of Coke or Blackstone. They effectively and consistently flout the principles of the Bill of Rights.

International Law would not be law as we have known it but would become an homogenized medley of the contributions of the Khrushchevs, the Maos, the Castros, the Nassers, the Titos, the Sukarnos and the Adlai Stevensons.

This admixture would be substituted for our Constitution, our Bill of Rights, our Common Law. Certainly state laws would be diluted beyond recognition.

Is that what our people want? The United States would be an ineffectual minority in this combine while the Khrushchevs, the Maos, the Nassers, the Sukarnos, the Nkrumahs would have much to say in setting the new codes of law. They would also go far toward dominating the creation, the disposition and the utilization of the world army. They would help to staff the world court.

Necessarily, this is the end of our thrilling heritage for which our forefathers and fathers fought. It is the direct opposite of that for which two million Americans gave their lives and blood in World War II and in Korea.

XV THE SECRETARIAT

It will be seen that an important control tower of this stupendous merger will be the Secretariat of the United Nations, headed by the Burmese, U Thant.

The Secretariat may be compared to the staff or management of a corporation, the board of directors of which is the General Assembly or the Security Council. The General Assembly is advisory to the Security Council, but, with the passage of time, is acquiring more and more power of action.

In the General Assembly, the United States has one vote in the one-hundred-eleven-member assembly. In a year or so that number will go to 126. In the Security Council, we have one vote in eleven.

At the head of the Secretariat is the Secretary General U Thant. He has been elected to serve until 1966.

The Secretary General, under the Charter, should be the "chief administrative officer of the United Nations" and should be responsible to that body. "The Secretary General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the organization."

The Charter of the United Nations gives as the purposes of the organization the following two provisions:

"To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal

rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;

“To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and, in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for the fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.”

U Thant has made no effort whatsoever to develop relations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determinations of peoples. Today, more than a billion human beings are in Soviet bondage, without fundamental rights and with nothing whatsoever to say toward their self-determination.

You will search in vain for any effort on the part of U Thant in behalf of the right of self-determination for the captive people under Soviet hegemony. On the other hand this so-called neutral works day and night to dismantle western “colonialism” which is far less repressive than Soviet “colonialism.”

While U Thant presses vigorously against the Belgians, the Portuguese, or the French, he works equally vigorously to “normalize” Hungarian relations with the U.N. and all the nations of the world. When the “Butchers of Budapest” moved tanks from the Soviet Union to crush the Hungarian people, world opinion forced the U.N. to conduct an inquiry into that act of genocide. Kadar has defied every U.N. effort to arrive at the truth, or to impose censure or sanctions. Yet U Thant works to wipe the slate clean of this sanguinary record, obviously

for the advantage of Khrushchev and Kadar.

Hungary is far more repressive of human rights than is, for example, Portuguese Angola. They cannot even be compared. Yet the double standard of U Thant is marked. Rather than work for sanctions against Kadar, he works to forge more securely the chains that bind the Hungarian people. He does this as well to Cuba and every other Soviet colony.

Instead of upholding his obligations under the charter, U Thant represents himself as the mediator between the bondage of the East and the freedom of the West which he equates. In fact, he is not even neutral between these disparate forces.

For instance, when he made his first speech after being elected permanent Secretary General he said that he was convinced that Premier Khrushchev did not want war and was sincere in his calls for peaceful coexistence. He chided the western nations for apparently failing to recognize the "full significance" of the changes in Moscow's thinking since the death of Josef Stalin. Thant, however, praised President Kennedy for agreeing to neutralization of Laos and thus admitting, wisely, that the "attempt to create a pro-Western government in Asia" had failed. The fact was, of course, that our effort had been to defend Laos against aggression. Here is what U Thant said:

"Mr. Khrushchev, who is now in control of the reins of government, belongs to a different category of leaders, with a coherent philosophy of the world based on the thesis, not of the inevitability of war, but of the imperative of competitive coexistence. We may or may not agree with his philosophy or

with his aims, but we have very good reasons to believe that he does not want war.

“The West does not seem to appreciate the full significance of this obvious change of political climate in the Soviet Union. Throughout the fifties most Western leaders saw the world as a battlefield between two antagonistic systems militantly expressing the principles of good and evil. Hence compromise was betrayal: evil could be held at bay only by iron-clad alliances, held together by mutual fear and backed by the constant threat of nuclear war. While this attitude could be criticized as a modern version of Hobbesian pessimism, it nevertheless provided a stable and fixed frame of reference in which decisions could be taken.

“This concept of iron-clad alliances and this view of the world purely in terms of black and white was, in essence, the Western response to Stalinism. However, this attitude persisted even when the character of Soviet challenge was already changing. This view of the world scene was perhaps partly responsible for many newly-independent countries pursuing a policy of nonalignment. President Kennedy proved himself to be a leader of vision and imagination when, early last year, he proposed a neutral Laos in return for a cease-fire. Thus the President wisely admitted that the attempt to create a series of pro-Western governments in Asia had failed. He accepted the view that the best the West could hope for in Asia—and for that matter Africa—is governments which fear outside interference and subversion as much as they hate colonialism; and that the function of Western policy should be the creation of a framework within which they can exercise their own freedom of choice.”

Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence is not a mystery. It is defined in the Communist manifesto of 1960, in the draft platform of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of 1961, the most authoritative Soviet source, and in official Soviet journals as a means to achieve world wide victory. The Communist manifesto of 1960 referred to it as an "intensification" of the world struggle. Assurances were given that "peaceful coexistence" does not mean, of course "peace" in the class struggle between socialism and capitalism or reconciliation of the Communist with the bourgeois ideology. Peaceful coexistence means not only the existence of states with different social systems, but also a definite form of world-wide class struggle between socialism and capitalism.

Khrushchev assured the comrades in 1961 that it involved "no compromise" in Soviet principles, but was, instead, an "intensification" of the world struggle.

Under "peaceful coexistence" Khrushchev has moved an expeditionary force across the Atlantic, with missiles, tanks, MIG's, submarines and electronic paraphernalia. He is now mounting from his established base in Cuba a campaign of terror, subversion and infiltration against South America. He is waging a terror campaign in Angola. He is moving forces down the Ho Chi Minh trail. He is attacking in Laos, and South Vietnam. He has built a wall in Berlin and shoots down human beings as they try to escape to freedom. He has human beings on torture racks in Budapest and in Havana. He is executing children and forceably taking others from their families to indoctrinate them in Communism.

Indeed, there is nothing "peaceful" about

Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence." Certainly U Thant knows this. His staff, with hundreds of research assistants knows it well. He is not a neutral at all. Directly behind U Thant is Assistant Secretary General Vladimir P. Suslov, Assistant Secretary General in charge of Security Council and Political Affairs. Trygve Lie called the post the "premier" Assistant Secretary Generalship because of its functional importance. The U.N. Handbook describes his duties in this fashion:

"The UN Secretariat has eight departments, each under an Under-Secretary. The first is the very important Department of Political and Security Council Affairs. The Under-Secretary in charge is one of the senior advisers to the UN Secretary General. Within this Department are the General Political Division, the Administrative and General Division and the Disarmament Affairs Group, and the latter includes the Atomic Energy Section and the Conventional Armaments and Enforcement Measures Section.

"The Department provides services for the Security Council and its subsidiary organs, including the Committee on Admission of New Members, the Disarmament Commission and the Peace Observation Commission. It prepares papers relating to peace materials relevant to the work of the Disarmament Commission; advises on security aspects of Trusteeship Agreements for strategic areas; participates with the Military Staff Committee Secretariat in the application of military enforcement measures; provides Principal Secretaries and Deputies and Assistant Secretaries for Committees created by the UN for investigation or conciliation; and performs additional work that may be assigned by the Secretary

General." (see UN Yearbook 1952, p. 46.)

When Suslov took the post in April, 1963, he left the post of first assistant to Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. Suslov has been in the Soviet diplomatic service since 1953. His predecessors had held similar posts in the Soviet Foreign Office. It is fantastic to assume that these hardened Soviet diplomats could be dedicated Communists, subject to severe Communist discipline, one day, and objective international civil servants the next.

All one need do is read, for instance, "The Moulding of Communists" by Frank S. Meyer, to understand the amount of concentrated and exhaustive training that goes into making the human being fit into the Communist mould, to realize that this naive concept of an objective Soviet International civil servant has no foundation in fact.

The predecessor of Suslov was the late Evgeni Kiselev. (*)

Suslov's predecessors in this key post have been:

1946-49 Arkady S. Sobelov, USSR

1950-53 Konstantine Zinchenko, USSR

(*) Kiselev held the following posts before moving into this important U.N. post:

He was Soviet Consul General in New York during World War II, and our intelligence agencies learned that he carried on extensive organizational work with Communist front groups in this country. Later, he was political adviser to Soviet Marshal Ivan S. Konev, commanding Red forces in Austria. The Associated Press story out of United Nations in New York describing his appointment as Assistant Secretary General stated that "his career has been filled with tough assignments. He was Soviet Ambassador to the United Arab Republic during the Suez crisis. He was regarded as the man who engineered the Soviet-U.A.R. arms deal and demonstrated to President Nasser, Soviet sympathy for his aims. He was Ambassador to Hungary 1949-54, when Stalinism was at its height in that country. In 1948-49 he headed the Department of Balkan Countries in the Soviet Foreign Ministry."

1954-57 Ilya Tchernyshev, USSR
1957 Dragoslav Protitch, Yugoslavia
1957-60 A. Dobrynin, USSR
1960-62 George P. Arkadev, USSR
1962-63 Eugveni D. Kiselev, USSR

Trygve Lie, in his volume, "In The Cause of Peace", wrote that the so-called big five had entered into an agreement to give this post to a Soviet national. He interpreted the agreement to be binding only during his term as Secretary General, but a glance at the actual holders of the post would indicate that it probably was of longer duration.

Actually, the underlying situation is worse than this. Alger Hiss, who was subsequently convicted for perjury involving his acts of Soviet espionage, was the organizing Secretary General of the U.N. at San Francisco. He put his proteges into many of the key posts in the organization, and many of them are there today.

The fact is that Ralph Bunche, Suslov and the Indian Narasimhan form a troika of assistants that runs the Secretariat right behind U Thant.

When the United States Senate Internal Subcommittee held its short inquiry into the Communist political activity of the U.S. citizens in the Secretariat, it found it to be heavily infiltrated.

I was the counsel to the Internal Security Subcommittee then. We surveyed the Soviet penetration into the United States representation only in the Secretariat. We assumed that we had no authority to investigate the Secretariat itself, although the Headquarters Agreement permitting the U.N. operation in New York never has been properly ratified.

Yet, what we uncovered was, to say the least, shocking, by our standards. I summarized these

hearings for my book "No Wonder We Are Losing". Let me use this summary here, as well as a summary of the conclusions of the Subcommittee:

The first witness to appear before us in open session was Alfred J. Van Tassell, who held the position of Chief of the Economic Section of the Technical Assistance Administration. Van Tassell had entered Government service through the National Research Project of the W.P.A., gone on to the Wage-Hour Division of the Department of Labor and from there to the War Production Board and the Senate Small Business Committee. His last government post before moving to the United Nations was Director of Reports Division of the War Assets Administration.

We had received evidence in executive session that during this period Van Tassell was a Communist. When we asked him about this evidence, he invoked, extensively, his privilege against self-incrimination. He was to be the first of 26 United Nations officials who pleaded the Fifth Amendment when asked about the evidence of their participation in the Communist conspiracy.

It should be pointed out that our Subcommittee had employed no investigators. The evidence that we turned up was evidence that had been readily available. As we were to learn later, it had been already disseminated by the FBI through all the security agencies.

Before the Grand Jury on April 1, Van Tassell had also invoked his privilege under the Fifth Amendment. He told our Subcommittee that he had, first orally and later in writing, given a full report of his conduct to his superiors at the Secretariat,

A. H. Feller and Byron Price (both American) and H. L. Keenleyside, (a Canadian). Not only did Van Tassell stay on his job after telling his superiors about his claim of privilege but, according to his testimony, Keenleyside had given him an expression of support. Keenleyside continued as head of UN Technical Assistance. Only after Van Tassell appeared before the Subcommittee in open session did Secretary General Trygve Lie act against him.

Some of the more important United Nations officials who could not deny the Committee evidence of their Communist membership were Joel Gordon, Chief of the Current Trade Analysis Section, Division of Economic Stability and Development; Jack Sargent Harris, Senior Officer, Research Section, Division of Trusteeship of the Department of Trusteeship and Information for Non Self-Governing Territories; Irving Kaplan, Economic Affairs Officer, Division of Economic Stability and Development; Frank Bancroft, Editor, Document Control Division; Stanley Graze, Project Officer, Technical Assistance Administration and Julia Older Bazer, Editor of the Editorial Control Section of the Bureau of Documents. All of these people drew large salaries and were in positions to hire and direct the activities of scores of other individuals. The Subcommittee was fortunate in receiving evidence about these particular officials. It lacked the staff facilities to inquire of others beyond the 26 it brought to the surface.

Probably the most important case during this series of hearings was Frank V. Coe. He was not associated with the Secretariat but was the Secretary of International Monetary Fund, a specialized agency of the UN. Coe's salary when he was sub-

poenaed was \$20,000. Coe had entered Government Service in the Treasury Department; he was the financial Advisor to the Federal Security Administrator; he was Assistant Director of the Division of Monetary Research, National Advisory Defense Council; he was executive secretary of the Joint War Production Committee and Assistant to the Economic Director of the Board of Economic Warfare; he was Economic Administrator of the Foreign Economic Administration; Secretary of the National Advisory Council on International and Monetary Problems; and Technical Secretary-General of the Bretton Woods Monetary Conference. All were positions of tremendous administrative power and great control over personnel.

Whittaker Chambers, we learned, had told the FBI in 1942 that Coe was involved in the Communist underground. In 1945, Elizabeth Bentley came forward and told the FBI that Frank Coe had been a Communist subordinate of hers.

The FBI had prepared thirteen security reports through the years, detailing this and other evidence to the various Government agencies. And yet Coe was able to climb higher and higher in the United States Government and then in the International Monetary Fund until December 2, 1952, when we questioned him and he testified:

"MR. MORRIS. I see you were the technical secretary at the Bretton Woods Conference?"

"MR. COE. That is correct."

"MR. MORRIS. Now, would you describe the duties of the technical secretary at that time?"

"MR. COE. The duties of the technical secretary were to see that papers were in order and ready for the committees, that the meeting places for the

committees were arranged, and that all of the administrative work of the Conference proceeded.”

“MR. MORRIS. Well now, during that period of time, were you the member of an espionage ring, Mr. Coe?”

“MR. COE. Under the protection afforded me by the Fifth Amendment, Mr. Chairman, I respectfully decline to answer that question.”

“MR. MORRIS. Well, you will not tell this committee whether you, while acting as the technical secretary of the Bretton Woods Conference, were then a member of an espionage ring?”

“MR. COE. I think that is the same question.”

“MR. MORRIS. I just wanted to be sure that you understood the question that you were refusing to answer.”

The next day, December 3, Coe was dismissed as Secretary of the Fund. The Committee had produced no evidence that had not been available for years to the appropriate Government agencies, while Coe was receiving higher and more important assignments. The FBI, Navy Intelligence and other security agencies knew who the Communists were, but were helpless to do anything. A Congressional Committee made remedial action possible.

In three cases, the action of the Subcommittee was later nullified by an UN Administrative Tribunal, which voted cash indemnifications to Jack S. Harris, Julia Older Bazer and Frank Bancroft.

Harris during the war was an OSS Military Intelligence Officer in South Africa. At the time of the hearings he was Senior Officer of the Research Section in the UN Trusteeship Division. When called by the Subcommittee, Harris refused to answer questions about his Communist membership. Julia

Older Bazer, an editor in the Document Control Division, also refused, under the Fifth Amendment.

After our hearings, the three officials, together with eight others, were dismissed by Secretary General Trygve Lie. Subsequently, however, the UN Administrative Tribunal ruled the Secretary General's action illegal and awarded \$40,000 to Harris, \$27,500 to Mrs. Bazer and to Bancroft.

The Subcommittee elected to look into the circumstances surrounding these awards. We learned that the Tribunal had based its award to Harris on the following facts:

“(a) Applicant's ‘outstanding professional competence’ as consistently referred to in his annual reports;

“(b) The very limited and specialized nature of his profession as anthropologist and African specialist whereby the opportunities of further employment are rare;

“(c) The fact that he joined United Nations at the special request of Mr. Ralph Bunche, Director of the Trusteeship Division, thereby terminating his previous career;

“(d) His age is now 41 years;

“(e) The fact that his review at the end of five years' service was due on May 2, 1952, and, had the work of review been up to date, might have expected a clear indication that his position was safeguarded until May 2, 1957;

“(f) The adverse comment was made by the State Department in May 1950 but was not such as to cause any action by the United Nations;

“(g) His base salary was \$11,690 per annum.”

The Subcommittee recalled Harris to the stand. Our rather precise questions elicited these answers:

"MR. MORRIS. Will you answer this question? Have you been a member of branch 1, third part of the Second Assembly District, New York City Communist Party?"

"MR. HARRIS. In answer to all similar questions I have declined to answer on the grounds stated, and I continue with the same answer."

"MR. MORRIS. Were you an organizer for the Communist Party during this period?"

"MR. HARRIS. The same period, the same reply, Mr. Morris."

"MR. MORRIS . . . Were you a special assistant to the American Consul General at Lagos, Nigeria, in the years 1942 and 1943?"

"MR. HARRIS. I was, Mr. Morris. Whether it was 1942 and 1943, I wouldn't recall, but sometime during that period."

"MR. MORRIS: Were you a Communist at that time?"

"MR. HARRIS. Questions of this sort I have already declined to answer, and I decline now on all grounds mentioned."

"THE CHAIRMAN. Sustained on the Fifth Amendment."

"MR. MORRIS. Were you from the years 1943 to 1945 a special assistant to the American Consul General at Pretoria and Capetown in the Union of South Africa?"

"MR. HARRIS. I have replied affirmatively on other occasions to this committee, and I do so now."

"MR. MORRIS. Were you a Communist at that time?"

"MR. HARRIS. To that question I have refused to reply."

"MR. MORRIS. After leaving the OSS, at that

time did you become assistant professor of social sciences at the University of Chicago in 1946?"

"MR. HARRIS. That is true."

"MR. MORRIS. Did you, on July 18, 1945, apply for a position in the Division of Dependent Area Affairs, in the Office of Special Political Affairs (of the State Department, an office headed by Alger Hiss)?"

"MR. HARRIS. My answer is the same, Mr. Morris. I decline to answer on the ground stated. . . ."

"MR. MORRIS. Are you a Communist Party member now, Mr. Harris?"

"MR. HARRIS. I give exactly the same answer I just gave."

Frank Bancroft was also recalled by the Subcommittee and the testimony taken during this session included the following:

"SENATOR WELKER. Now, from the year 1943 until the year 1946, were you a member of the Communist Party?"

"MR. BANCROFT. I decline to answer, sir, on the grounds that it might tend to incriminate." . . .

"MR. MORRIS. Mr. Bancroft . . . Did you not hold in 1944, and through the subsequent period described by Senator Welker, Communist Party Card No. 93158?"

"MR. BANCROFT. Sir, I decline to answer on the ground that it might tend to incriminate me . . ."

"MR. MORRIS. Well, you say that and many of the other witnesses say that, Mr. Bancroft, but this Committee simply wants to know if you held Communist Party registration certificate No. 93158."

"MR. BANCROFT. I decline to answer the

question on the basis of my rights under the Fifth Amendment.”

“MR. MORRIS. Do you know Roy Hudson, who has been a member of the National Committee of the Communist Party?”

“MR. BANCROFT. I decline to answer on the grounds given.”

“MR. MORRIS. Do you know Al Rothbart, an organizer for the seamen’s branch of the waterfront section of the Communist Party?”

“MR. BANCROFT. I decline to answer on the grounds given.”

“MR. MORRIS. Mr. Bancroft, have you ever resided at 1008 Webster Street, New Orleans, La.?”

“MR. BANCROFT. I have sir.”

“MR. MORRIS. Were Communist Party meetings held at your home at that address?”

“MR. BANCROFT. I decline to answer on the grounds given.”

“MR. MORRIS. Did David Carpenter, the secretary and district organizer of district 20 of the Communist Party of Texas, visit your residence on March 20, 1945?”

“MR. BANCROFT. I decline to answer, sir, on the grounds given.”

Julia Older Bazer, the recipient of the \$27,500 award, gave the following responses to the Subcommittee:

“MR. MORRIS. Mrs. Bazer, isn’t it a fact that you stayed in Moscow from 1934 to 1937?”

“MRS. BAZER. I refuse to answer that question . . .”

“MR. MORRIS. Isn’t it true that you had Communist training during that period?”

"MRS. BAZER. I refuse to answer that question on the same grounds."

"MR. MORRIS. Isn't it a fact that while you were in Moscow you resided with Anna Louise Strong, roomed with Anna Louise Strong?"

"MRS. BAZER. I refuse to answer that question on the same grounds." . . .

"MR. MORRIS. Have you not been a writer for the Moscow Weekly News?"

"MRS. BAZER. Same answer."

"MR. MORRIS. Did you take an oath at the time you were an employee of the United States Government that you were not a member of an organization that advocated the overthrow of the United States government by force and violence?"

"MRS. BAZER. May I confer with my counsel?"

"SENATOR JENNER. You may."

"MRS. BAJER. I refuse to answer that question under the provisions of the Fifth Amendment."

"MR. MORRIS. Isn't it a fact, Mrs. Bazer, that you became employed as the public-relations director of the Russian War Relief at 11 East 30th Street, New York City, in November 1943, and held that position through June of 1944?"

"MRS. BAZER. I refuse to answer that question on the same grounds."

"MR. MORRIS. Were you not the managing editor of the publication called the *American Review of the Soviet Union* which was a publication of the American-Russian Institute during 1944 and 1945?"

"MRS. BAZER. I refuse to answer that question on the same grounds."

"MR. MORRIS. Did you marry a Dr. Nathan Helfgott." . . .

"MRS. BAZER. In 1947 . . . That is correct."

"MR. MORRIS. To your knowledge, was not Dr. Helfgott the doctor for the Soviet Embassy in Washington?"

"MRS. BAZER. I refuse to answer that question on the same grounds . . ." . . .

"MR. MORRIS. To your knowledge, was not Dr. Helfgott a member at large of the Communist Party over a long period of time prior to his death on February 20, 1948?"

"MRS. BAZER. I refuse to answer that question." . . .

"MR. MORRIS. Did you apply for employment with the Soviet Embassy in 1946?"

"MRS. BAZER. I refuse to answer that question on the same grounds."

"MR. MORRIS. Did you ever work for the Soviet Embassy in 1946?"

"MRS. BAZER. I refuse to answer that question on the same grounds."

"MR. MORRIS. Mrs. Bazer, did you notify the Secretary General on December 4, 1952, that you were not and never had been a member of the Communist Party?"

"MRS. BAZER. I must refuse to answer that question on the same grounds."

The U. S. delegation to the UN protested the granting of these three awards as well as the other eight totaling in all \$179,120. But it was to no avail. The awards were nevertheless granted.

Here was a Communist victory accomplished with the sanction of free delegations. The decision established, in effect, that even if UN authorities

discovered secret Kremlin agents in their employ, they could do nothing about it. Let it be remembered that these were not Soviet-appointed officials, but part of the U.S. quota.

Trygve Lie knew they were Communists and acknowledged that some of them were giving him plenty of trouble. He had appointed a Special Advisory Commission to rule on their invocation of the Fifth Amendment, and was advised that their position was inconsistent with their positions of trust. Lie thereupon discharged them. But from that point on the Communists had little effective opposition on the real merits of the case, and proceeded to score a series of legal victories.

One of the more important witnesses to testify at our series of hearings on subversion in the United Nations was Whittaker Chambers. I visited him at his farm in Westminster during that fall and learned from him that he had known David Zablodowsky, who was head of the Publications Division of the Secretariat. He also had had an experience with David Weintraub, Director of the Economic Stability and Development Division of the Secretariat, and with Irving Kaplan, Weintraub's assistant. Accordingly, I asked Chambers to testify before us. He dutifully agreed to be subpoenaed and come to New York on the morning of October 23.

Chambers testified that in the late 1930's, in the course of breaking with the Communist underground, he decided to establish a name and a real-life personality by taking employment with the U. S. Government. Otherwise he was simply Carl of the Communist underground, who could have been dispatched by the Soviet secret police without anyone knowing of his demise.

Chambers went on to testify that J. Peters, his superior in the espionage network, not knowing his design, offered to help him with this employment and sent him to the National Research Project of the WPA. Peters told Chambers that Weintraub and Kaplan, then co-directors of the National Research Project, were both secret Communists. So was Weintraub's sister, Rose. Chambers went to the project, saw Kaplan, and got the desired job. Later, by way of corroborating Chambers' story, the Subcommittee asked Rose Alpher, Weintraub's sister, if she were a Communist at the time. She invoked the Fifth Amendment. Kaplan had already done the same.

Later, we acquired evidence of Communist membership with respect to three other assistants of Weintraub. When subpoenaed, they invoked their privilege under the Fifth Amendment. The three were Sidney Glassman, Marjorie Zap and Herbert S. Schimmel. We had no facilities to investigate further and brought to the surface only what we could in the few weeks available to us.

As for David Zablodowsky, head of the Publications Division, Chamber testified that, back in 1930's, Zablodowsky had done some work for the Soviet underground. This fact was not denied by Zablodowsky.

Another important division that was, according to our evidence, rather seriously infiltrated was the Technical Assistance Division under Keenleyside. In addition to Van Tassel, Herman Zap, a training officer, and Stanley Graze, a project officer, invoked their privilege under the Fifth Amendment. I asked Graze: "Are you presently engaged in espionage against the United States?" "Have you ever in

the past engaged in espionage against the United States?" He declined to answer both questions. Significantly enough, in 1950 Graze was one of Senator McCarthy's original 87 cases, all having been cleared by the Tydings Committee over minority protests.

After the hearings on December 2, 1952, we realized that we had to come to a temporary halt. Accordingly the Subcommittee drew up another unanimous report which it issued for the benefit of the new Senate.

This report read, in part:

"The subcommittee sought to determine how it was that so many officials of questionable loyalty to the United States could be hired and charged to the United States quota at the Secretariat. The subcommittee called as witnesses Carlisle Humelsine, Deputy Under Secretary of State in Charge of Security, John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of State of U.N. Affairs, and Adrian S. Fisher, Legal Adviser for Department of State.

"These State Department officials testified that, although the United Nations was set up in 1946, they knew of no arrangement undertaken by the State Department prior to the autumn of 1949 to give to the Secretary-General derogatory security information concerning United States citizens at the Secretariat. Late in 1949, in response to a request from the Secretary-General, an informal agreement was worked out whereby officials of the Secretariat gave to the State Department, for security checks, a list of United States citizens working for the Secretariat. Thereupon the State Department undertook to assemble such derogatory security information as was available in the United States Government's files (but undertook no field investi-

gation), to have it evaluated by certain State Department officers (but not the Department's regular Security Division evaluation officers) and orally to communicate to unnamed officials of the United Nations a conclusion, arrived at by State Department officials on a basis determined within the Department, as to whether the Department desired to object to the continued employment of any such person by the UN.

"A conclusion that the Department would so object was communicated as an 'Adverse' report. In no case was any distinction made, in reporting to the United Nations, between persons concerning whom there was no derogatory information, and those concerning whom there was derogatory information, but to whose continued employment by the UN the State Department did not at that time desire to object.

"In nine of the eighteen cases the State Department, belatedly, made adverse comments and the United Nations officials took no action until the subcommittee hearings. In one case the State Department made no adverse comment until after the Grand Jury investigation; and in two cases until after the officials had appeared before the Senate subcommittee. In six UN Secretariat cases the State Department made no adverse comment.

"This subcommittee feels that the evaluation made by the State Department in the eight cases (i.e., the six upon whom no adverse comment was made and the two whom comment was made only after the appearance before the Senate Subcommittee) was so faulty and so delinquent from a security standpoint, as *prima facie* to justify, if not actually require, an interrogation to determine if it was the

result of any subversive influence. Accordingly, the State Department officials Messrs. Hickerson and Humelsine were asked to give the subcommittee the names of the evaluating officials and other Department officers involved so it could interview them in connection with efforts to determine what further steps need be taken toward investigating the possible influence of subversive forces in this connection. Mr. Hickerson and Mr. Humelsine refused to name the State Department officers involved. They refused on the ground that the Secretary of State had directed them to withhold the names

“For a period of approximately three years—between the time of the formation of the United Nations in 1946 and sometime in 1949—there was no safeguard whatsoever, from the standpoint of the United States, against employment by the United Nations of United States citizens who were disloyal to their country, or were actively engaged in espionage on behalf of some foreign power We are now confronted with the fact that during the years from 1946 to 1949 a number of American nationals of doubtful loyalty have secured lodgment and tenure with the United Nations Organization. We are in no position to assess the injury which they may have dealt to American interests and security during this period

“When the United States Department of State finally took cognizance of the situation respecting possible disloyalty of United States nationals employed by the United Nations, it was fully at the instance of the United Nations and not even partially as a result of any security officials within the State Department.

“The agreement then entered into between the

State Department and the United Nations has been variously portrayed. Both oral evidence and written testimony before the subcommittee indicates that the State Department undertook to make a check on persons whose names were submitted by the United Nations as employees or prospective employees thereof, and as a result of its check to make a report to the United Nations

“Even within the narrow limits of what the State Department undertook to do, it appears to the subcommittee that the Department did not perform in accordance with its commitment. The Department failed, over lengthy periods of time, to make any reports with respect to certain employees of the United Nations, whose names had been submitted under the agreement referred to, in spite of the fact that security reports on such employees were heavy with derogatory information . . .

“There is no evidence before us that the State Department has taken any disciplinary action against any of those who may have been guilty of any errors of omission or commission in connection with this matter”

One of the U.N. Security Officers once told me during the hearings that they were surprised at the particular individuals we surfaced. They had other security cases, he said, which they would have thought to be the “real” ones.

Considerably later, in 1961, the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee had another fortuitous look at the makeup of the Secretariat. The occasion was the case of Povl Bang-Jensen, the international civil servant who was found dead in New York in 1959. He had been approached at the time of the Hungarian revolt in 1956 by a cluster of Soviet of-

officials who made an abortive attempt to defect to the West.

The Subcommittee took the testimony of the widow of Mr. Bang-Jensen, and this read:

THE TESTIMONY OF MRS. BANG-JENSEN

MR. SOURWINE. Do you have any knowledge respecting an approach made to your husband by an individual member of the Soviet delegation to the United Nations or of the Secretariat respecting the desire of one or more members of that delegation or of the Secretariat to defect to the West?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Yes, in a general way I do.

MR. SOURWINE. This knowledge comes to you from communications made to you by your husband?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Oral communication.

MR. SOURWINE. Yes.

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Yes.

MR. SOURWINE. You have no knowledge of it except what he told you?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Only what he told me, yes.

MR. SOURWINE. And what was it that he told you about this?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. He told me that there were several members of the United Nations Secretariat who would like to defect. They were unwilling to do it through the normal channels because one of the bits of information which they told my husband was that there was infiltration in the security agencies of the U.S. Government, in the CIA and in the State Department, and that they were unwilling to approach anyone in those particular

organizations. They asked my husband if he would take this information for them to the President.

MR. SOURWINE. Of the United States?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Yes.

MR. SOURWINE. Now, by "infiltration," did you understand your husband to mean, or did he make it clear that he meant Soviet infiltration?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Yes, and they were willing to bring some evidence of that, and also evidence of some control of the 38th floor, which is the administrative offices of the United Nations, by Russians when they were given asylum.

MR. SOURWINE. To be sure I understand this, your husband was approached by a single member of the Soviet delegation or the U.N. Secretariat?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. The information came from an individual speaking on behalf of several.

MR. SOURWINE. Yes. Do you know if the individual was, himself, one of the group who wished to defect?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Yes, yes.

MR. SOURWINE. The presumption would necessarily be that that was so.

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. It is more than a presumption. I know that.

MR. SOURWINE. Your husband said this to you?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Yes.

MR. SOURWINE. And this group of defectors, through the intermediary who approached your husband, said that they had information respecting Soviet infiltration of security in the United Nations—

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Yes. Not security in

the United Nations, but the workings of the United Nations.

MR. SOURWINE. Respecting Soviet infiltration to the 38th floor, which you say is the administrative floor?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Yes.

MR. SOURWINE. And respecting Soviet infiltration of agencies of the Government of the United States?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Yes.

MR. SOURWINE. Were those agencies specified?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. I understood that they were the CIA and the State Department.

MR. SOURWINE. Your husband told you this?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Yes. And the reason for the reluctance of the men who wanted to defect, to defect through the normal channels, was because there was this infiltration.

MR. SOURWINE. They were afraid that their desire to defect would become Soviet knowledge before they had achieved safety and there would be reprisals?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Yes.

MR. SOURWINE. And they offered, through the intermediary who contacted your husband, to bring this information about this infiltration—bring it over and give it to the American authorities if their defection could be accomplished and they could be promised safety?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Yes. They did not give it to my husband. My husband's role was only that of an intermediary there.

MR. SOURWINE. He was only told they had such information?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Yes.

MR. SOURWINE. Not what it was?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. No.

MR. SOURWINE. Not the nature of the infiltration?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. No.

MR. SOURWINE. Did your husband assent to their desire to have a contact directly to the President of the United States?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. No. He felt that that would be impractical and not the way to do it, and he gave the matter some thought and told them that he would try to find some way in which he could bring this information to the attention of the proper American authorities.

MR. SOURWINE. And did he find such a way?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. He did.

MR. SOURWINE. Did he tell you about it?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Yes. He gave this information to a friend who was a member of the U.S. mission to the United Nations.

MR. SOURWINE. Who was this man?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. It was Mr. James Barco.

MR. SOURWINE. B-a-r-c-o?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Yes.

MR. SOURWINE. What did Mr. Barco agree to do with the information, if you know?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. My husband gave this information to Mr. Barco orally, in the middle of the delegates' lounge at the United Nations. He asked Mr. Barco to transmit it to the proper American authorities—with one restriction, and that was that this information was not be put on paper in any form whatsoever.

MR. SOURWINE. Did Mr. Barco agree to this?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. He did. He said that he would give this information to Mr. Lodge. He asked my husband to go with him later that day to give the information to Mr. Lodge.*

My husband was reluctant to do it. He thought Mr. Barco could transmit the information himself, and he didn't.

MR. SOURWINE. Your husband told you all that?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Yes, he did.

MR. SOURWINE. Did he tell you that he was satisfied with Mr. Barco's proposal to give this information to Mr. Lodge?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Yes. He presumed Mr. Lodge, as a member of the Cabinet, would take it to the proper authorities.

MR. SOURWINE. As a member of the Cabinet?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Well, isn't he? I'm correct—I believe he is a member of the Cabinet. Isn't he?

MR. SOURWINE. I think the technical situation is that he is not a member of the Cabinet; he sits with them.

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Attends Cabinet meetings. Excuse me. But, in effect, he is very close to it.

MR. SOURWINE. Do you know what Mr. Barco did with this information?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. I did not know at the time. We had since heard that this information was put in a memorandum and transmitted to the State Department.

MR. SOURWINE. How did you hear this?

*The Honorable Henry Cabot Lodge, then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations and head of the U.S. delegation.

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. That we heard from journalists and from people in the United Nations. We did not hear it directly or from Mr. Barco.

MR. SOURWINE. Your husband heard this and told you about it?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Yes, he did. Yes.

MR. SOURWINE. Did the defectors in fact defect?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Pardon me?

MR. SOURWINE. Did these prospective defectors in fact defect?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. No.

MR. SOURWINE. Do you know why not?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Well, I presume that this effort which they made came to nothing, so it was not possible for them.

MR. SOURWINE. Do you know what happened to them, or any of them?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. I know that one went back to Russia, but I know no more than that about him.

MR. SOURWINE. Who was the one that went back to Russia?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. I don't know his name.

MR. SOURWINE. But your husband told you that one had gone back to Russia?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Yes.

MR. SOURWINE. That indicates he knew the name of at least one of the defectors; did he not?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. Of course he knew the name of the man with whom he had talked.

MR. SOURWINE. That was the man that went back to Russia?

MRS. BANG-JENSEN. I believe he also knew the names of the others, but he did not tell me the

names, nor did I want to know.

THE TESTIMONY OF ROBERT MORRIS

In the summer of 1958, Bang-Jensen also told his story of the potential defectors to Judge Morris, whose account parallels that of Mrs. Bang-Jensen on all essential points.

Judge Morris said, in his statement of March 15, 1960, to the subcommittee, that Bang-Jensen had never identified the number of would-be defectors, but that he was convinced it was plural because Bang-Jensen had spoken in one case about "the principal one."

When the "principal defector" spoke of Soviet control over the 38th floor and Soviet infiltration in American intelligence, Bang-Jensen was at first skeptical. The defector, or defectors, finally convinced him by showing him intercepts of three coded messages coming through from the Soviets to the 38th floor.

On November 20, 1956, Bang-Jensen discussed the matter with Mr. James Barco, counselor of the American delegation, whom he had come to know well in consequence of his service as secretary of the Palestine Conciliation Commission.

He asked Mr. Barco's assistance in setting up a meeting with Allen Dulles. According to Judge Morris' account, Bang-Jensen specifically requested that Mr. Barco convey his request orally and that none of the information be committed to paper.

Bang-Jensen further informed Judge Morris that, all told, he met with Mr. Barco eight times from November 20, 1956, to June 8, 1957, in an effort to arrange the meeting with Allen Dulles—but that no word ever came back and that the meet-

ing was never arranged.

Judge Morris reported that he had met with Mr. Barco on August 18, 1958, in an effort to check out this information. Mr. Barco, in the course of this conversation, apparently indicated that he had received some information from Bang-Jensen corresponding with the information that Bang-Jensen had later given Judge Morris. He also agreed that there had been a number of meetings and that he would not challenge the figure eight.

Here was evidence that the guiding hand of the proposed merger was actually under Soviet control at the time of the Hungarian suppression. Yet this significant evidence did not even slow up the planners in their mad rush to turn all military power over to these people at the helm of the instrument of merger.

I have been urging responsible people in Washington that one of the most elemental preconditions of this "synthesis" as U Thant calls it, would be a thorough investigation of the extent of Communist infiltration into the control tower itself, the Secretariat. On the record, it has been substantial.

XVI HOW CAN DISARMAMENT BE ACHIEVED

It will be recalled that in his account of the Rostow Memorandum, Willard Edwards points out that disarmament is to be pursued even without a formal agreement.

“Any idea of the United States contemplating a ‘first strike’ is ruled out. Planning in that direction is not relevant since the United States does not plan to initiate a nuclear attack on Communist nations. Military men assailed the section as against all sound principles of war for which planning against all contingencies is essential.

“Despite all rebuffs to date, strenuous efforts should be continued to get an agreement on limited arms control, the policy paper recommends. It is suggested that the United States might advance a program not requiring formal negotiations.”

There is good reason to believe that we are, indeed, beginning to disarm unilaterally. We are withdrawing our B-47s from Europe. We have dismantled our missile bases in Turkey. We have withdrawn our B-52s from Italy and England.

Let the *U.S. News and World Report* of August 5, 1963 speak on this:

WHERE U.S. HAS CUT BACK NUCLEAR-WEAPONS SYSTEM

Radical cutbacks, as a result, have been put

into effect where nuclear weapons systems are concerned. What the record shows:

B-47 bomber. Already cut back from 1,100 to 650. Will be down to 300 by next summer, entirely abandoned by 1966. Power of the B-47 bomb load is more than 10 megatons—that is, equal to more than 10 million tons of TNT.

B-52 bomber. Production was halted despite congressional desire to continue and the operational fleet was frozen at 630 planes. Some models will be scrapped inside five years; other presumably can be kept flying a few years after that. In the latest model, the H series, the B-52 will carry more than 50 megatons over a 10,000-mile range.

B-58 bomber. The production line was shut down last autumn—also over congressional opposition—after about 80 planes were earmarked for combat-type duty. This plane carries a 15-megaton load at supersonic speeds.

RS-70 bomber. Planned by the Air Force as bomber of the 1970s, but held up in development stage. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and many members of Congress want to see it in production, but chances are slim.

Thor missile. Four bases in England, with 60 medium-range missiles capable of reaching into Russia, were ordered dismantled shortly after Soviet Russia withdrew its missiles from Cuba.

Jupiter missile. Bases in Italy and Turkey, with a total of 45 missiles, were ordered abandoned. They had just become operational at a cost of 555 millions.

Skybolt missiles. Designed to extend the life of the bomber force well into the 1970s, this project was killed, although Britain, which was to share

the missile, protested strongly.

Nike-Zeus "missile killer." Army requests to put this antimissile missile around U.S. cities were refused, over strong protests from Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The project has been scrapped in the search for a substitute.

Military satellites. The Midas "spy satellite" was killed after a decision that 15 extra minutes' warning of missile attack was not worth the millions still required to perfect it. Numerous other military space projects have been abandoned or delayed.

Navy carriers. Signs point to a cut of as much as one third in the Navy's fleet of 15 attack carriers. Construction is being delayed on an additional new carrier authorized by Congress last year.

Overseas bases. Flying bases in England, Morocco, Spain, France, Guam and elsewhere have been or will be shut down. Prospects are for further withdrawals from overseas, possibly involving one of the two Army divisions in Korea and some 50,000 men in Europe.

Atomic production. The aim is to shut down half of the nation's 14 major plants manufacturing nuclear materials for weapons. The Administration feels that the present stockpile is bigger than any demand it can foresee.

Nuclear-test ban. The U.S. alone took the initiative in suspending atmospheric tests in June as evidence of good faith before formal test-ban talks with Russia. Military requests to continue testing were set aside.

VIEWS OF MILITARY LEADERS

—WORRIES ABOUT FUTURE

What does this add up to?

Testimony released after closed-door hearings of Congress tells one part of the story. Worry about the future U.S. military position is being expressed on a scale not equaled in recent years.

Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, Air Force Chief of Staff, challenged Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara on the new strategy. He disclosed also that he had appealed directly to Mr. Kennedy—to no avail—after almost 5 billions was cut from the original Air Force budget.

Service rivalries were set aside by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in opposing cuts by the Administration's top civilians in the Pentagon.

Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Army Chief of Staff, told Congress that he had recommended continuing both the Air Force's RS-70 and the Skybolt. He was not "horse trading" with the Air Force in giving this support, he said. These were "purely military judgments."

Adm. George W. Anderson, then Chief of Naval Operations, supported Air Force programs and the Army's Nike-Zeus. He favored extending the life of bombers, he explained, because of doubts about the reliability of missiles.

It was General LeMay who came forward with the most emphasis. He disclosed that the budget as sent to Congress had been shorn by the Administration of 321 million dollars sought for 100 more Minuteman missiles, 543 millions for the RS-70 and 454 millions for the Skybolt.

This exchange then took place before the House Subcommittee on Defense Department Appropriations:

Representative Gerald R. Ford (Rep.), of Michigan: "With the decision on the RS-70 and with the

decision on Skybolt, with the decision in the Minuteman area as you look down the road, General LeMay, to 1968 and years thereafter, do you feel our strategic posture will be as strong, relatively speaking, as it is today?"

General LeMay: "You have to visualize what the threat is going to be at that time. At this moment, I would say no, and that is what worries me. . . . You cannot buy back time, Mr. Ford."

Representative Ford "Do you accept the philosophy that mutual deterrence or nuclear stalemate is inevitable?"

General LeMay: "No, I do not accept that philosophy at all.

"I think it is a dangerous philosophy to say: Well, a stalemate is going to exist, we cannot do anything about it; therefore we do nothing. If we accept mutual deterrence, this will, I think, inevitably lead to defeat. . . ."

Retired Admiral Chester Ward, former Judge Advocate General of the United States Navy was more emphatic in his speech of April 8, 1963 before the Hawaii Foundation for American Freedoms in Honolulu. He said:

"We are in much more danger this year than we were in Cuba last year because of the greater interval since the Soviets first broke the test ban in September of 1961. They began preparing the Cuban adventure early last year. They had not then had time to completely rework their nuclear stockpiles and to manufacture their new warheads with the more efficient techniques. This year we're getting further and further from the original development of their new efficiency, so they now have not only

these more powerful weapons, but many more of them. In this connection, we need to know how we're being fooled on the "numbers racket" and on the firepower aspects of nuclear weapons. Under the guise of "modernization" of our defense we are cutting down, and even scrapping, our massive nuclear capability. Consider the removal of the U.S. missiles from Turkey and Italy. You'll remember during the Cuban crisis, Khrushchev said, "I'll pull these missiles out of Cuba if you pull yours out of Turkey and Italy." And the Administration immediately said, for domestic publication, in effect: "No deal, no deal, we don't make deals under pressure." The Administration still denies that we made any such AGREEMENTS. Nevertheless, as you know, we are now presently engaged in pulling those missiles out of Turkey and out of Italy. Actually, this illustrates another technique of avoiding telling absolute lies to deceive the people; we don't make AGREEMENTS any more, we engage in UNILATERAL ACTION.

"The best illustration of the new technique of substituting unilateral action for agreements, is in the extended nuclear test ban negotiations presently going on. These negotiations cover the de facto disarmament of the U.S. which is actually taking place. In other words, after all these centuries somebody has finally discovered a useful purpose for disarmament negotiations. They are wonderful cover for de facto unilateral disarmament.

"Here is how it works. We debate furiously and continuously on whether we will have seven inspections under a test ban, in Russia, or only two. We came down from 20 to ten to eight to seven. The Soviets three years ago said they'd grant one

or two, and they're still saying that. They withdrew that for a while and re-instated it with great fanfare. The honest American people tend to think that if we are debating so vigorously the necessity for seven inspections instead of just two, that we certainly wouldn't do anything dangerous in the way of nuclear disarmament or actual disarmament.

“Actually, every time we pull one of those missiles out of Turkey we are cutting down our nuclear firepower by a tremendous factor; worse than that, we are now even withdrawing the B-47 bombers from Europe. Intermediate range bombers. When one says ‘intermediate range’ bomber, it doesn't sound nearly so impressive as ‘intercontinental’ bombers. From published figures, however, a B-47 can carry about 40 megatons of explosive power to dump on the Soviets.

“How much does our most modern missile carry? Minuteman was originally designed to carry six-tenths of a megaton, just a little more than one half of a megaton. It's probably been stepped up now, so it can carry perhaps one megaton and they hope to increase it some day to two. Same with Polaris. Polaris carried eight-tenths of a megaton; they hope to build that also up to one megaton or maybe two. But, they talk about replacing our SAC bombers with Polaris, and Minuteman missiles. Every time you replace a B-52—a B-52 can carry 60 megatons—with a Minuteman you lose 59 megatons, and “replace” it by one megaton. Now the danger in all this, is that we are withdrawing, scrapping our massive nuclear strike capability. The reason for the Skybolt scrapping, of course, was not merely to render prematurely obsolete the British

Royal Air Force, with its 170 bombers. The primary target was the Strategic Air Command of the United States with its several thousand bombers.

“These U. S. SAC bombers worry Khrushchev. It was these bombers which actually saved our necks in the Cuban crisis. Once the U-2 photographs had given the warning of the Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba, Strategic Air Command bombers went on airborne alert, or a so-called “slingshot alert,” and we were capable of delivering upon the Soviet Union something like 30 kilo-megatons of destructive power. Now a kilo-megaton is a thousand-million ton equivalent. Thirty-thousand million tons equivalent of destruction on Russia. Now you can begin to see why it was that Khrushchev withdrew his missiles. This is why the only attack which will be made in the nuclear age is a surprise attack.

“Khrushchev pulled those missiles back, not because he was afraid of the United States’ ‘superior power,’ not because of our ‘boldness’ and our apparent ‘readiness to fight a nuclear war.’ He pulled them back simply because he didn’t want 30 kilo-megatons of destruction—30 thousand million tons of destruction rained on Russia. It would destroy Russia. In point of fact, even 20 kilo-megatons would probably destroy 90% of the Russian population, all of its industry and military potential.”

Despite this unilateral disarmament (along the lines of the Rostow Memorandum) I know that individual Senators are being given assurances by leaders of the State Department that they will not put our overall plan into effect without a formal treaty to be submitted to the Senate for ratification.

The legislation passed by Congress setting up the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency so provides.

Nevertheless, the Administration has a substantial majority in the Senate, and an effort to obtain ratification would be accompanied by a surging emotional backdrop. We are seeing this now (in August 1963) in connection with the campaign to get the Test Ban Treaty negotiated in Moscow by Under-Secretary Averell Harriman ratified.

If the announcement should ever be made that Nikita Khrushchev is prepared to sign a specific disarmament agreement, there will be diffused over the whole world such an emotional outpouring of optimism that the pressures on individual Senators for ratification will be enormous.

But let us look at the disarmament already engaged in, and then at the two basic elements of the planned disarmament and the simultaneous build-up of an international peace force.

As we have shown, we are disarming, and Congress has nothing to say about it. The RS-70 bombers which the military leaders tried to put into production were amply supported by the Senate and the House of Representatives, but they were successfully vetoed by the Secretary of Defense who contended they were not needed.

The fact of the matter is that the President of the United States, as Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces, has the power to reduce forces—drastically, if so inclined. Without consulting Congress, President Truman built up a powerful U.S. Army that marched under the banner of the United Nations and subsequently President Eisenhower disbanded much of it, also without consulting Congress.

The President is almost daily making decisions disbanding a certain combat or service unit, activating or inactivating National Guard divisions, or putting units of the fleet into mothballs. There is no practicable limit to this power.

With respect to the creation of an International Peace Force, this has been done on at least three occasions without a treaty.

Here are the provisions of the United Nations Charter which make this possible under the existing U.N. treaty which, incidentally, is the law of the land, equal to our Constitution. Read carefully Articles 39 through 51 of the Charter:

ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION

Article 39—The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with the provisions of Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 40—In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 41, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take ac-

count of failure to comply with such provisional measures

Article 41—The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruptions of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42—Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate, or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea or land forces of members of the United Nations.

Article 43—1. All members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.

3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between

the Security Council and groups of member states and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their constitutional processes.

Article 44—When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfillment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that member, if the member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that member's armed forces.

Article 45—In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, members shall hold immediately available national air force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined, within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 46—Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 47—1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.

2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of

the Security Council or their representatives. Any member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the committee shall be invited by the committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that member in its work.

3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible, under the Security Council, for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.

4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional subcommittees.

Article 48—1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the members of the United Nations, or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.

2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.

Article 49—The members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.

Article 50—If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted

with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.

Article 51—Nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense, if an armed attack occurs against a member of the organization, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present charter to take at any time such action as it may deem necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

At the time of the Korean War we moved an army under these provisions. Congress was never asked to ratify that bloody war that was waged for four years. The U.N. Army in Korea was a powerful military force, and, while it operated under a United Nations that was then generally pro-Western in orientation, it can serve as a precedent for another "Peace Force" doing battle in the years ahead, without ratification by the Congress.

In 1962 U Thant, with the backing of the United States State Department, pressed two invasions into Katanga and made good use of "armed forces, assistance and facilities" supplied by the United States without ratification by the Congress.

In 1963 U Thant sent a force into Yemen to bolster up the Soviet-Nasser-supported regime of Al-Salal against "attacks" by the pro-Western

“royalists” as they are termed in U.N. circles.

With these experiences in mind, when we read the statements of Ambassador Adlai Stevenson opening the General Assembly meetings in New York, asking for a “strengthened peace-keeping force” we can see this avenue being paved. In this way, the goal of an all-powerful military force may be approached under the existing U.N. Treaty already signed. Congress need never be consulted.

Obviously, what the people who are directing the Secretariat have done has been to go beyond the Charter of the United Nations to convert the idealistic U.N. into an instrument of world government without authority. What they have done has never been legally sanctioned. Listen to U Thant himself on this subject before the Harvard Alumni Association on June 13, 1963:

“There has been a tacit transition from the concept of collective security as set out in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, to a more realistic idea of peace-keeping.”

This, of course, has been accomplished without ratification of any kind by the Congress.

It is often forgotten that the United Nations went into the Congo in the summer of 1960 at the specific request of Patrice Lumumba, an outspoken Khrushchev sympathizer.

Let us pause here for a moment to look more carefully at the Yemen adventure. The United States quickly recognized the new pro-Soviet regime after it overthrew the “Royalists.” U Thant sent a force at once supporting the regime’s control over the country. The *New York Times* of July 30, 1963 carried the following page one story:

WASHINGTON, July 29—“The Soviet Union

is building a modern jet airport for Yemen. The United States fears that the Russians are planning to use the airport as a stepping-stone to Africa.

"The project is part of an extensive Soviet campaign to develop access to Africa and to find a means of hopping across that continent to reach Cuba by air.

"About 500 Soviet technicians are at work on the Yemeni airport, which will have an 11,500-foot runway that can handle the largest four-engine Soviet jet aircraft.

"Although the project was requested by the new republican Government of Yemen, that barren Middle Eastern country has little use for such a modern facility.

"Washington is watching the project with concern. Analysts here believe the Soviet Union is counting on the airport to provide access to East Africa, improve air connections with India and help open shorter routes across Africa to Latin America.

"The importance of African air routes to the Soviet Government was brought home to the Kennedy Administration during the Cuban missile crisis last fall.

"At that time Guinea refused to give the Soviet Union permission to land planes on her territory en route to Cuba with personnel and supplies. This action helped reinforce the United States naval blockade of Cuba.

"In the intervening months, Soviet diplomats have been engaged in a major effort to extend Soviet air routes into Africa.

"Guinea, Algeria and Morocco have been under pressure to let the Soviet commercial airline, Aeroflot, land on flights to Havana. Ethiopia and Soma-

lia have been urged to permit Soviet planes to land and proceed down the east coast of Africa.

"The Sudan, which now permits Soviet planes to land and fly westward, has been asked to let the planes fly south from Khartoum. None of these countries has yielded to Soviet demands.

Vital to Plans

"Yemen is vital to Soviet plans because of her location on the Red Sea opposite East Africa and about 1,000 miles south of Cairo.

"As long ago as June 10, 1962, Izvestia, the Soviet Government newspaper, published a map showing a proposed Soviet air route from India to Madagascar via Yemen.

"Officials here also believe the Soviet Government could link its India route with its route into Egypt and the Sudan if it could use Yemen. Yemen could also provide an alternate landing point to the Sudan for a Soviet air route across Africa.

"The Soviet Government has been trying to get an air agreement with Yemen. The proposal was turned down last year by the royalist Government before it was overthrown.

"Officials here assume that the new republican Government will sign such an agreement when the new airport is completed. The Soviet Union is providing manpower to build the airport and it is believed to be providing the funds from a \$20,000,000 development loan recently extended to Yemen."

Earlier, the same newspaper carried this story on June 16, 1963:

"WASHINGTON, June 15—The number of Soviet military technicians and instructors in Yemen is reported to have increased sharply in recent weeks to about 900 or 1000. United States and other dip-

lomatic sources agree on this estimate.

“They also have received similar reports that some of the Russians have flown combat missions against rebellious royalist tribesmen, presumably in Soviet aircraft brought to Yemen by the United Arab Republic.

“The Soviet personnel have been brought in by the antimonarchist regime of President Abdullah al-Salal, apparently to support him and a United Arab Republic force of 28,000 troops against the royalists.

“Most of the Russians are said to have arrived since March, when the United States persuaded the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia to agree to “disengage” from the Yemen civil war. United Nations observers are due in Yemen in the next few days to patrol the Saudi frontier against furtive aid to the royalists. Simultaneously, Egyptian forces are supposed to begin to withdraw.

60 Present in September

“Last September, when President al-Salal deposed the Imam, Prince Mohamad Saif al-Islam al-Badr, there were about 60 Soviet technicians in Yemen, the remnants of a group of 150 stationed there in the monarchist days of 1961. By April, the number of Russians was said to have increased to 450. The number has doubled since then.”

How long will this basically illegal trend continue? It is illegal because the United Nations Charter never was ratified as a framework for world government. In fact, when it was ratified in 1945, Secretary of State Edward Stettinius formally assured the Senate that it was specifically not world government that was involved.

The syndicated columnist Edith Kermit Roosevelt in her column that appeared in **The Wanderer** of January 10, 1963 put in one place the statements that are attributed to writers for several government-supported projects. She wrote:

WASHINGTON, D.C.—In an era of news management the best way to learn about Government policy is at the think factories financed openly or secretly by Government funds. Here university professors from all over the country receive grants which enable them to learn and then promote the Government line. Under the auspices of these “independent, scientific research groups,” studies and books are published to mold “mature” or “informed public opinion.”

A key think factory is the Institute for Defense Analysis, 1666 Connecticut Avenue N.W. Seven-year-old IDA, a non-profit organization whose contracts are solely with the Federal Government, was founded by a \$500,000 grant from the Ford Foundation. Its president is—not unexpectedly—Richard M. Bissel, former Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

One of IDA's announced goals is “to return an Ambassador (particularly a young Ph.D. or graduate student) to industrial and professional circles, inculcated with a view of the world's business gleaned at first hand.”

IDA presently operates under six contracts. Five for the Defense Department cover weapons-systems evaluation, research and engineering, communications techniques, operations research and training people in that field for the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance and support for the newly-formed

Institute of Naval Studies. The sixth contract, with the State Department, covers studies for the U.S. Disarmament Administration. It is in these IDA studies that policy is spelled out. Here are some themes to be promoted over the coming months:

“Red China is to be pictured as the real threat in order to persuade the American people of the necessity for peaceful co-existence with Soviet Russia.

“The specter of China can be an asset in seeking military and political arrangements with the Soviets in Europe and, more significantly, can permit a relatively stable period of peaceful co-existence,” writes General “X” in **Reactions To A Nuclear-Armed Communist China: Europe And The United Kingdom**. In the same IDA Study Memorandum, September 15th, 1962, General “X” suggests that the United States compromise with Red China over the fate of Quemoy and Matsu to enlarge what is purposefully assumed to be “the existing fissure between the Soviets and the Chinese.”

The theme of unilateral disarmament is to be made respectable. In **A Proposal For A Ban On The Use Of Nuclear Weapons**, October 6th, 1961, Dr. Morton H. Halperin suggests that even if the Russians don't disarm we should do so anyway.

“Some of these steps,” says Dr. Halperin, “might be taken unilaterally either with the aim of inducing reciprocation or because they are valuable in themselves independent of the Russian response.”

In his IDA Study Memorandum, **Arms Control And Inadvertent War**, March 10th, 1962, Dr. Halperin says that in arms-control agreements “It might be stressed that inspection was not absolutely necessary” and that “the United States might, in

fact, want to invite the Soviets to design the inspection procedures if they seem to be interested in them.”

A man to watch for clues to policy is Dr. Lincoln P. Bloomfield, formerly with the State Department's disarmament staff and now director of the Arms Control Project at the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In IDA Research Memorandum No. 3, **The Politics Of Arms Control: Troika, Veto And International Institutions**, October 6th, 1961, Dr. Bloomfield points out that “short of a major catastrophe the difficulties in obtaining widespread public approval and explicit Senate ratification of a genuine world government are obvious.”

How then can Federal Government planners bypass the will of the American people and their elected representatives? Through disarmament negotiations.

In **A World Effectively Controlled By The United Nations**, March 10th, 1962, Dr. Bloomfield explains that “without disarmament such a system (of world government) is probably unobtainable.”

And how can the American people be conditioned to accept the State Department plan to eliminate national armies and replace them with a UN police force?

“If it (world government) came about as a series of unnerving trips to or over the brink, it would come about at any time,” according to Dr. Bloomfield.

World government is to be presented to the American people as the only answer to a war in which they would suffer unacceptable destruction or could not win.

This may explain the President's pledge to Khrushchev not to liberate Cuba; the sending of American strategic materials behind the Iron Curtain and the other "no-win" policies. As Dr. Bloomfield says: "If the Communist dynamic were greatly abated, the West might lose whatever incentive it has for world government."—(Copyright 1962 by Edith Kermit Roosevelt Syndicate.)

I have tried to obtain the original documents mentioned by Miss Roosevelt. When I wrote the organizations involved asking for them, the requests were refused. In view of what these excerpts profess to say, it would certainly seem appropriate for a Committee or a Subcommittee of the Senate of the United States or of the House of Representatives to subpoena these papers, and the authors thereof, to determine if they are written with authorization of the Defense or State Departments.

One final word. When we see how over-riding have been the United Nations officials when they have had only those weapons given them by the member nations, can you imagine how high-handed and arrogant they would be with all the effective weapons in the world in their hands

XVII THE STEP AHEAD

As this is written (August 24, 1963) tremendous pressure is being brought to bear on the highest policy level for a Test Ban Treaty. This pressure campaign is very illuminating.

In 1958, the United States unilaterally stopped testing nuclear weapons. At that time, the United States was far ahead of the Soviets in nuclear arsenals. That was a desirable situation, because we know that weapons in our hands would be used to insure peace.

But by our self-imposed cessation of testing new nuclear weapons, we allowed the Soviets to catch up in many respects. Dr. Edward Teller has estimated that Khrushchev is ahead in some fields of nuclear explosives. At any rate, the action on our part in refraining from testing was disastrous as far as our leadership in the field was concerned.

Khrushchev, being a Communist, not only did not refrain from testing, but used our credulity as a fitting backdrop for secret preparations for a dramatic series of almost fifty detonations, some of great magnitude.

One would think that this devastating act of folly on our part would be a lesson for our leaders today. Apparently it is not.

Duane Thorin, a competent student of Soviet affairs who served with the Navy for twenty-two years and who has recently turned his attention to this problem of disarmament and test-ban agree-

ments, wrote the July 1, 1963 Washington Report of the American Security Council. Because this article so concisely sets forth many of the elements of this problem, I am quoting it herewith in its entirety. It is most revealing:

WASHINGTON REPORT

“If we don’t get an agreement . . . now, I would think generally that the genie is out of the bottle and we will never get him back in.”

—President J. F. Kennedy, May 8, 1963

“Chairman Khrushchev, Prime Minister Macmillan and I have agreed that high-level discussions will shortly begin in Moscow looking toward early agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty.”

—President J. F. Kennedy, June 10, 1963

Why are U. S. policy-makers now placing such special emphasis on a test ban treaty—more than most other elements of their disarmament plans? None of the reasons usually given to the public seem to explain the now-or-never attitude displayed by Mr. Kennedy. Neither do they justify the concessions which U. S. negotiators have offered and seem ready to offer in Moscow, in their efforts to entice the Soviets into immediate agreement. In fact, some of the more widely publicized reasons turn out to be simply promotional propaganda, rather than an actual consideration in policy planning.

For example, one major theme of test ban propaganda has been the claim (now disproved) that continued testing would create great hazards from radioactive fallout. However, in testimony given to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 11, 1963, Secretary of State Rusk dis-

counted this factor as a primary consideration in our policy, except for its usefulness in promoting the idea. Mr. Rusk said that the problem of radioactive fallout was of "secondary importance, but nevertheless significant . . . in large part because of real or assumed dangers from fallout . . ." (emphasis added), which he said has caused nuclear testing to become a "key political issue in a great many countries."

Executive policy-makers are not interested in a test ban treaty primarily for any value which it might have in itself. To them, it is a "confidence-building" measure; that is, policy-makers see it as a first step along the road toward further objectives which they have laid out for this Nation under the label of "disarmament". President Kennedy referred to the test ban treaty as one of the "first-step measures of arms control", in the June 10 address wherein he announced the coming high-level negotiations in Moscow. Secretary Rusk, in his March 11 statement to the Senate Committee, called it a "necessary" first step. He explained as follows:

"What we need are arrangements on which confidence can be built as a matter wholly separate from the question of whether the Russians will trust us or we can trust the Russians, because the very arrangements, themselves provide a basis for growing confidence."

This "confidence-building" function of a test ban treaty in the overall plan for our Nation's disarmament was set forth even more clearly by a U. S. participant in the Sixth Pugwash Conference (Moscow, Nov.-Dec., 1960). Mr. Richard Leghorn said at that meeting:

"Of overwhelming importance will be the com-

pletion and rapid implementation of a treaty banning nuclear tests. This treaty will be of more value as a confidence-building measure than as a measure of real disarmament. . . . Its successful completion is an absolute 'must' for progress toward the disarmament treaty."

Walter W. Rostow, chairman of the State Department Policy Planning Council, also a participant in the 1960 Pugwash conference, endorsed and reaffirmed the Leghorn idea on "confidence-building". Thus were the Soviets informed as early as 1960 that, from the official U. S. viewpoint, the principle purpose of a test ban was to "build confidence". Americans, meanwhile, long subjected to diverse propaganda on the "need" for a test ban for other reasons, are only now being gradually let in on the real purpose it is intended to serve. As to whose confidence needs "building"—in announcing unilateral suspension of testing by the U. S. on June 10, President Kennedy said he was doing so to "make clear our good faith"; as if it were the U. S., rather than the U.S.-S.R., who has proved unworthy of trust.

Possibly to build confidence in the minds of Americans, Mr. Rusk and others have claimed that a test ban treaty now would be to the military advantage of the U. S., because it would arrest nuclear weapons development in both camps at their present levels. This claim presumes a present U. S. superiority which is **not** at all certain in several key elements of strategic capability and which, according to U. S. weapons experts, cannot be made certain without further atmospheric testing. Opposition by military chiefs to Mr. Kennedy's unilateral test suspension is reportedly due largely to this consideration. Moreover, both Secretary Rusk (on March 11) and Presi-

dent Kennedy (on June 10) have acknowledged that the Soviet Union cannot be relied upon to abide by a treaty, except insofar as it might be in their own interests to do so. As an offset to this recognized Soviet duplicity, Mr. Rusk said the treaty must be designed so that "the scope of any violation which might escape detection" could not be so extensive as to "substantially affect the military balance." Additionally, he noted that we should keep ourselves prepared to resume testing in short order (a feat of preparedness which Mr. Kennedy called "impossible of execution", in March of 1962).

In view of the real purpose which U. S. policymakers see for a treaty, could the U. S. public ever be confident that their own officials would tell them of any clandestine Soviet testing? Or would those officials overlook such Soviet duplicity in order not to jeopardize the further goals which they have set for us in the name of disarmament? Finally, is there any basis for American confidence in that ultimate disarmament goal?

Although U. S. policy spokesmen are generally quite candid about their ultimate objectives in statements to the public, its most significant aspect is often obscured by high-sounding talk of "world peace—peaceful coexistence and competition of different systems—solving the world's economic and social problems—etc." A relatively new theme appeared in Mr. Kennedy's June 10 address wherein he said, "if we cannot now end our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity." At the 1960 Pugwash conference, Mr. Rostow spoke similarly of making the world "safe for ideological differences." (A rather preposterous notion when dealing with an ideology dedicated to the extinction of diversity.)

When the emotional appeals are put aside, the ultimate goal may well be that expressed by Mr. Rostow in his book **The United States in the World Arena**, in which he says:

“It is a legitimate American national objective to see removed from all nations—including the United States—the rights to use substantial military force to pursue their own interests. Since this residual right is the right of national sovereignty and the basis for the existence of an international arena of power, it is, therefore, an American interest to see an end of nationhood as it has been historically defined.”

This would seem to be borne out in the U. S. proposal for “Complete and General Disarmament” (Sept., 1961) and further evidence is contained in Rostow’s closing statement to Soviet and other participants in the 1960 Pugwash conference. He said:

“The maximum objective is a new system of relations among states based on general and complete disarmament with strict international control.

“If this grand conception is to come to life there is need to create a clearly marked turning point . . . First, a completion of the test-ban negotiations which should build confidence and open the way to the step beyond.

“I think we all understand now that the work done in the United States on the short run is not designed to frustrate long run and more ambitious objectives.

“I hope that the remarkable channel of communications which the Pugwash movement has opened will be kept open and rapidly enlarged. . . . I hope our working papers will flow steadily

back and forth. Some problems we face can only be negotiated. But some of them require that scientists work together not as negotiators but as professional colleagues.”

“The transition to disarmament and the world of disarmament are, if I may use the phrase, a New Frontier.”

This is a double jeopardy to Freedom’s cause in present U. S. policy. Our unilateral suspension of testing, plus other self-imposed restraints, while trying to woo the Soviets into a test ban agreement, leaves the way open for them to gain a decisive advantage in some key element of strategic power. The alternate possibility—subordination of our National military power to an international authority formed in coalition with the Communists—is but another route to the world-wide totalitarian system prescribed by Karl Marx.

The way to peace between nations and human freedom within them is through the proper exercise of national sovereignties, including military power. Only when there has been a clear return to that premise in our policy planning will the American people have any reason for confidence in the security of their Nation and their Freedom.

The press of August 4, 1963 carried the following story showing how correct Duane Thorin was in his analysis:

LONDON, Aug. 3—U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations, arrived in London tonight on his way to Moscow to witness the signing of the nuclear test ban treaty by the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union. He denied that he had a per-

sonal disarmament plan to present.

"I am going to Moscow at the invitation of the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. and the U.K.," he said. "I regard the treaty as an important and symbolic improvement in international relationships, especially between East and West.

"It also creates a very congenial atmosphere for future negotiations on other aspects of disarmament."

Mr. Thant added: "If I am given the opportunity at Monday afternoon's ceremony, I would like to make some brief observations on the next steps to be taken by the big powers on nuclear disarmament." He declined to be more specific.

I ask the reader—isn't it all there? Walt W. Rostow, now our Chief Policy Planner attending the Pugwash Conference in Moscow in December 1960, called for "First a completion of test-ban negotiation which should build confidence and open the way to the step beyond."

Then, Secretary Dean Rusk called, on March 11, 1963, for the test-ban as "a necessary first step." The Secretary of State told the Senate on that day, remember: "What we need are arrangements on which confidence can be built as a matter wholly separate from the question of whether the Russians will trust us or we can trust the Russians, because the very arrangements themselves provide a basis for growing confidence."

Finally, there is the policy of the United States itself, working for the dissolution of national armies and the creation of an all-powerful world army and an international court of justice to which all nations must submit. It all fits the formula outlined in Walt

W. Rostow's book "The United States in the World Arena" which contains this remarkable statement in the summary: ". . . . it is, therefore, an American interest to see an end of nationhood as it has been historically defined."

XVIII THE HARVEST

Khrushchev's record is no better now than it ever was. In the spring of 1961, President Kennedy and the Soviet Premier made a solemn agreement on a peaceful, neutral and independent Laos. Not only have the Communists shattered this agreement, but the details of new violations of the accord are breaking into the newspapers alongside the glowing reports of optimism generated by the signing of the test-ban treaty. The attitude of the State Department seems to be "Laos was last year's agreement; this year it will be different."

Khrushchev and Soviet Ambassador Andrei Gromyko gave President Kennedy personal assurances that no offensive missiles were being moved into Cuba at the very moment that the lethal weapons were, in fact, being mounted and pointed toward our cities. This perfidy, perpetrated at the personal level of the President himself, is not even being mentioned today, although less than a year has passed since the betrayal. When we reflect on it, this and other betrayals of confidence seem actually to have set in motion the present series of negotiations.

Meantime, Soviet espionage is actually more extensive and more grievous than ever before. In view of what they have been permitted to steal from us in the past, the conclusion about Khrushchev and his assistants "mellowing" would seem extreme. Yet I heard our Attorney General make the statement on television last year.

Only a few weeks ago, the evidence implicating Swedish Air Force Colonel Stig Erik Wennerstrom with Nikita Khrushchev's espionage network made the news. The work of this "Disarmament Official" has been devastating. Let this Associated Press dispatch from Stockholm relate the extent of the Wennerstrom harvest:

Stockholm, Sweden, July 14 (AP) "Sweden's armed forces have embarked on a massive program to close the defense gap caused by the betrayal of military secrets to the Soviet Union by Air Force Colonel Stig Erik Wennerstrom.

"There is an atmosphere of almost wartime urgency at the Defense Ministry.

"Lights burn far into the night as army, navy and air force officers grapple with the task of repairing the probable loss of Sweden's entire defense strategy to the Russians.

"Officers have been recalled from vacation and redeployment of army, navy and air force units may already be under way.

"Security services are working day and night to investigate other possible leaks in the military establishment or the government.

Sweden Crippled

"Everyone—the government, opposition parties, defense staffs and the newspapers—agrees that Wennerstrom crippled Sweden. The tall, suave airman diplomat has confessed that he gave military secrets to the Russians for 15 years.

"And during that period he had access to Sweden's entire defense strategy. Defense sites and strengths? Military codes? Key mobilization and communication plans? Wennerstrom knew all about

these and more. He knew a lot about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's defense plans and weapons. He visited NATO military installations. He was in frequent contact with Danish and Norwegian military men. He was friendly with many top Western diplomats here.

"The armed forces are reported to be acting on the assumption that Wennerstrom 'gave away Sweden' and that the Russians now know all about its plans to repel a possible Soviet attack.

Acute Crisis

"Stockholm's influential **Expression**—the largest newspaper in Scandinavia—referred to 'a time of acute crisis for our defense' and said editorially.

"The Wennerstrom spying has in essential parts knocked out the Swedish defense. About this all reports agree. Hectic measures are being taken to repair, if possible, the damage caused.

"The armed forces face an immensely complicated and costly task. Fortifications, headquarters and battle stations, hangars, ship tunnels repair shops and storage depots have been built into granite accommodations at top-secret locations. Newspapers have reported there are 500 of these.

"Two deep tunnels have been carved out of a mountain to accommodate destroyers, submarines and other naval units. Plans have called for the entire navy to be provided with tunnels. These installations cannot be moved even though their locations may now be precisely located by the Russians. Must new ones be built?

Major Redeployment

"The Swedish Royal Air Force of 1,000 all-jet, first-line planes is said by the Swedes to be the fourth largest in the world after the U.S. Air Force, the So-

viet Air Force and the British Royal Air Force. The air force must now consider whether a major redeployment to new bases underground and on the surface is needed to maintain its combat effectiveness.

'For its oil supplies Sweden depends entirely on imports. The safe storage of fuels is essential for its military preparedness. Oil and gasoline are stored in vast underground tanks in rock chambers and abandoned mines. Hidden pipelines link these to the berthing places of tankers and tank cars. It will take years and vast sums of money to relocate these.

'Military expenditures now take about one-fifth of Sweden's national budget. According to some estimates, it now must spend the equivalent of hundreds of millions of dollars more, and quickly, to repair the damage of the loss of defense secrets. Newspapers predict taxes will be substantially increased to pay the cost.

'Informed sources say Sweden probably will face vastly increased military research costs as a result of the Wennerstrom case. Although Sweden is neutral and not a member of NATO, the Western powers for some time have quietly passed on to the Swedish armed forces important technical data on defense matters. They also sold weapons to Sweden. The view here is that the West probably will halt such aid in view of uncertainty about Sweden's security system.'"

The Soviet representatives (and their satellites) at the United Nations are committing espionage on an extensive scale. There is absolutely no abatement in their acts of perfidy. News reports regularly attest to this. Yet our trust in Khrushchev increases,

almost, it would seem, in proportion to the increase of the betrayal rate.

Our "Disarmament" posture, reflecting as it does that we are again reposing our trust in our enemy, makes the atmosphere far more conducive to espionage and penetration into the policy-making institutions of our nation. The record of World War II when we were conclusively pressured to be allies of the U.S.S.R. establishes this fact and the surveys made by Congressional Committees have brought this out time and time again. (*)

Thus, while we disarm, and reach into the sky for this fantastic merger with our dedicated enemy, committing ourselves to a minority position, Khrushchev pounds on to his self-appointed destiny. The atmosphere we are creating militates against a realistic defense of our wonderful heritage.

Strength alone will save us.

Substituting trust in Khrushchev for our own strength is a short-cut to destruction—or, more likely, to nuclear blackmail.

(*)The following statement by J. Edgar Hoover appears on page 491 of the Hearings before A Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Eighty-eighth Congress: "Taking full advantage of the freedoms that exist in our open society, the Soviet Union continues to carry out an espionage and intelligence attack against this country on a scale unequalled in history. 'Communism over God, Russia over the world' is a statement attributed to Soviet Premier Khrushchev, at the 22d Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in October 1961. The statement accurately describes the Soviet goal, world conquest. In the pursuit of this objective Communists preach 'peaceful coexistence' but they continue to apply and carry out an espionage effort, characterized by treachery, deceit, and unlawful activities in an attempt to obtain every conceivable type of information concerning the security of this country."

APPENDIX

STATEMENTS OF ROBERT MORRIS BEFORE
THE JOINT COMMITTEES—FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS, ARMED SERVICES, AND JOINT ATOM-
IC ENERGY 5 PM August 27, 1963.

POINT 1:

The treaty before the Committees is expressly made a first step toward “an agreement on general and complete disarmament.” The preamble makes the point that the “principal aim” of the signatories in entering into the accord is “disarmament.” Furthermore, the outline of the treaty that we have put on the table at Geneva to achieve disarmament specifically provides that this test ban treaty become an “annex” of that treaty when signed. Our leaders have told the Senate that indeed it is a “first step” toward disarmament.

Thus not only is this treaty indissoluble from the disarmament treaty, by its own preamble, by the express wording of the disarmament treaty and by the declaration of responsible leaders, but it is to be a mere “annex” to the later accord.

Those military leaders, notably the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who have reconciled the treaty to national security, have done so on the express condition that vigorous implementation of safeguards will be maintained by the defense department including “aggressive and comprehensive underground testing to the limit of the treaty.” Other military leaders could not even make this reconciliation.

These safeguards go beyond, in urgency, any present posture of the Department of Defense and are obviously prompted by the testimony of such leaders.

As Norman Cousins has pointed out in a recent letter to the editor of *The New York Times*, this mood is completely out of the spirit of the test ban treaty. It is directly antithetical to the disarmament treaty to which this treaty is to be an "annex". Negotiations will soon be continued on disarmament. This sense of urgency will almost necessarily become a casualty of the spirit of the U. N. as we strain, as we have time and time in the past, to "show our good faith."

A brief look at our treaty outline which we have already put on the table for negotiation at Geneva will reveal that we have already offered to the Soviets the dismantling, not only of testing facilities and monitoring stations but our whole defense establishment, in its entirety, with all its personnel, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves. Under this treaty we have expressly offered to build up an all powerful United Nations army, with ourselves having only those forces necessary for "internal policing" and for supply to the U. N. force that will come into being three years after we sign that treaty.

The language of the Outline of the treaty reads:
REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES

To the end that upon completion of Stage III they would have at their disposal only those forces and organizational arrangements necessary for agreed forces to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens and that they would be capable of providing agreed manpower for the United Nations Peace

Force, the Parties to the Treaty would complete the reduction of their force levels, disband systems of reserve forces, cause to be disbanded organizational arrangements comprising and supporting their national military establishment, and terminate the employment of civilian personnel associated with the foregoing.

It will be seen from this that not only will we not have a monitoring system or testing facilities but not even a reserve or as much as a Navy league. The high resolve to maintain safeguards now expressed will certainly wane as we make progress, as our leaders are now so confident, toward this disarmament accord.

On this point we should read Secretary Rusk's firm resolve of last year when he said:

"In President Kennedy's words of March 2, 'We know enough now about broken negotiations, secret preparations, and the advantages gained from a long test series never to offer again an uninspected moratorium.' The same could equally be said about an unverified treaty obligation such as the U.S.S.R. is now proposing. We do not intend to be caught again as we were in the autumn of 1961, and there is no reason why we should have to be caught again by a unilateral Soviet decision to resume nuclear weapon tests. This is a risk to national and international security which the United States cannot and will not take. A test ban, or any disarmament measure, will be acceptable to us only when it is accompanied by adequate measures of verification."

POINT 2:

The presidential transmission of this treaty

dated August 8 read: "This treaty is the whole agreement The treaty speaks for itself".

Ambiguities have already been uncovered. The words "any other nuclear explosion" ("other" than nuclear test explosions) on their face clearly include detonations undertaken for self defense, to aid our allies or for "peaceful uses of the Atom." The unilateral statement of Undersecretary George Ball cannot put any other interpretation on the clear meaning of the words. There is nothing in international law to support a contention that the rule of construction of a treaty is any different in this respect than the rule of construction of a statute or any legal document, namely, if the document is clear on its face, recourse may not be had to any other source. If, as the President expressly said in transmission, the treaty "speaks for itself", there will have to be an amendment, if we want the interpretation of the State Department to prevail. Otherwise this is a trap and incontrovertibly does what the Soviets have been trying to do for years—keep us from using modern weapons to defend ourselves and our lives.

What the State Department has done has been to invoke previous drafts of the treaty including Soviet rejections to come to the conclusion—not possibly inferable from the treaty "itself"—that detonations for self defense or for defense of our Allies are not proscribed but that explosions for peaceful construction are. Obviously the State Department is not allowing the Treaty to speak for itself as the President says. If the drafts and the minutes of the negotiations give the answers the Senate desperately needs, then all the minutes and all the drafts and all the correspondence including that between heads

of State (Khrushchev and our President) on the instant treaty, and the treaty of which this is to be an "annex", should be made available to the Senate before ratification.

POINT 3:

From the State Department interpretation that "Project Plowshares" and the "Peaceful use of the Atom" are now to be shelved in so far as they involve nuclear explosions, unless approved by Khrushchev, we have reached a most unscientific impasse. Many people had hoped that nuclear forces were to be harnessed for peaceful purposes. Certainly this portion of the treaty should be amended.

POINT 4:

The treaty could not prevent the Soviets from testing, even in the atmosphere, if any one of its satellites including Cuba and Red China stay outside its framework. The dispute between the Russians and the Red Chinese is a struggle difficult to analyze that could be solved tomorrow as was the "struggle" between Tito and Stalin. The Soviet could use the sovereignty of any one of its satellites as a cover for the illegal testing and no one could do anything about it. Moreover, any one of the Satellites could abrogate, if need be, after signing and give them their cover.

Despite the hostile talk between the Red Chinese and the Russians, it should be remembered that it was the Russians who gave the Chinese their nuclear plants and reactors, in the first place.

POINT 5:

Despite past assurances, there is nothing in the treaty to prevent the Soviets, as they have in the past, from translating the scientific information that they gained from their spectacular high yield tests

into lethal weapons in the months ahead and then abrogating as their constitution provides, at will, and leaving us at their mercy. We could not even expeditiously abrogate but would have to wait 90 days to withdraw as Mr. Harriman has said. Abrogation on our part would involve action not only by the President, but both Houses of Congress.

The appropriate Committee of the Senate—the Judiciary Committee through its Internal Security Subcommittee—has previously set forth the Soviet record on previous treaties. May I offer it for the record at this point. The pattern of violations is inexorable. It leads to only one workable conclusion. The Soviets will test again when it suits their purpose. In fairness to them they do not break the treaties. They use them as they say they will. “Treaties, like pie crusts, are made only to be broken.” It is our foolish attribution to them of our codes, our standards, and our respect for the plighted word that justifies the word “broken” in this connection. The Soviet code is clear—that which furthers Soviet purpose is moral, legal, and just. Any other foolish assumption flies in the face of the record and the nature of this enemy. When Andrei Vishinsky entered a debate in New York before he died he said: “Laws, what laws? We make our own laws.”

POINT 7:

There is a feeling frequently expressed, as it was last week by former President Harry S. Truman, that the Soviets really cannot be trusted. Here is how he was quoted (“The idea is to get a start on those things and you can always amend them”). You cannot amend them. The treaty expressly says that the “Original Parties” including the U.S.S.R. can veto any amendment.

Moreover, Article Six of our Constitution expressly makes this treaty equal to our very Constitution. Thus, it cannot be casual as the former President suggests. Has anyone thought through the significance of the statement that "the principal aim" of the signatories is "Disarmament"? Even though it appears in the Preamble, the act of ratification under the Constitution gives it extraordinary legal stature. Does it thereby provide authority for legal action not now authorized by the Constitution? Does it perhaps set the stage for Executive action by the President to implement this Congressional grant of authority covering "disarmament?"

POINT 8:

There are to be negotiations after this on a non-aggression pact. It has been said that this treaty stands by itself. Demonstrably it does not. The State Department is drawing on outside sources to interpret it. Will the minutes and the drafts that the State Department uses to interpret this treaty show that there is no connection? Not only would a nonaggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact freeze us from opposing Communism in the Warsaw Pact countries but it would do the same in any country such as Cuba, British Guiana, Brazil, that might wish to join the Warsaw Pact. What does this do to the Monroe Doctrine, the O.A.S. treaties? It would make de jure, the present de facto impasse. The Senate should write in an express reservation on this point.

POINT 9:

These are serious commitments made by the ratification of this treaty. It would seem that since the national election is next year, these things should become the issues so that the people of the United

States can speak without being committed irrevocably. If there is to be another administration next year, why commit it now to these serious risks? Let the people, the fount of sovereignty speak.

POINT 10:

We always hear, "But this time it is different." Here is what Khrushchev said to the Red Chinese in answering their charges on July 14, 1963:

"We (the Soviets) fully stand for the destruction of imperialism and capitalism. We not only believe in the inevitable destruction of capitalism but are doing everything for this to be accomplished as soon as possible."

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